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When Quacking Like a Duck Is
Really a Swan Song in Disguise:
How Windsor’s State Powers
Analysis Sets the Stage for the
Demise of Federalism-Based
Marriage Discrimination
Nancy C. Marcus†
Abstract
United States v. Windsor may, in the views of some, walk and
talk like a federalist duck, but upon closer examination, the decision
is not a federalist decision at all but is, rather, a swan song for
federalist-based marriage discrimination.
Leading up to Windsor, federalist-based arguments for marriage
equality were advocated by the late twentieth-century minimalist
movement, which viewed the judiciary as an ineffective agent of social
change and urged the narrowest of constitutional claims, pessimistic
about the likelihood of successful broad individual rights claims to
same-sex marriage rights. After Windsor’s release, some have
interpreted it as being a federalist decision, due in part to the
opinion’s inclusion of a state powers discussion.
This Article describes both how backlash-fearing minimalists were
wrong and how those who read Windsor as a federalist decision are
wrong. The Article details an evolution in LGBT rights advocacy
from backlash-fearing minimalism to a renewed faith in the courts
serving an important role in the protection of constitutional rights.
Finally, the Article offers alternative readings of Windsor’s state
powers discussion in light of the passage’s surrounding language,
including the Court’s pointed invocation of Loving v. Virginia as an
applicable federalism-limiting precedent. Whether the state powers
discussion in Windsor is read cynically as strategic rhetorical
maneuvering or more generously, the decision does not in any sense
†
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leave marriage equality up to the states to decide but rather builds
the latest layer of a growing foundation for the ultimate affirmation of
same-sex marriage rights by the Supreme Court.

Contents
Introduction ................................................................................................ 1074
I.

The Minimalist Movement’s Influence on FederalismFocused Strategy in DOMA Challenges .................................. 1079
A. Backlash Fears and Hollow Hopes: The Movement Toward
Minimalism .............................................................................. 1079
B. How the Minimalist Movement Led to a Push for Federalist AntiDOMA Arguments .................................................................... 1088
C. The Doctrinal Bases for the Plaintiffs’ Argument and the Court’s
Holding in Windsor ................................................................... 1095

II.

Why Windsor Is Not a Federalist Decision .............................. 1097
A. About Those “Seven Full Pages . . .” ........................................... 1099
B. Windsor’s Loving Reminder of the Primacy of Individual Rights ..... 1099
C. Federalism Discussed Solely in Context of Evaluating DOMA’s
Stated Justifications .................................................................. 1103
D. Textualist Reading of Unambiguous Holding Reveals an Individual
Rights Fifth Amendment Holding, Not a Federalist Tenth
Amendment Holding .................................................................. 1106
E. Court Details Examples of Federal Legislation in Area of Marriage 1107

III. Why, Despite Quacking Like a Duck, Windsor Is Actually
a Swan Song for Federalist-Based Marriage
Discrimination ................................................................................... 1107
IV. Beyond Minimalism: Foundation-Building Jurisprudence as
a Giant Leap, Not Small Step, Toward Significant
Evolutions in Rights Protections .............................................. 1112

Introduction
The adage, “if it walks like a duck and quacks like a duck” is a
familiar one with various formulations and contested origins. Some
attribute “the duck test” to “celebrated ‘Hoosier Poet’” James
Whitcomb Riley, who purportedly wrote over a century ago, “[w]hen I
see a bird that walks like a duck and swims like a duck and quacks
like a duck, I call that bird a duck.”1 And yet, some attribute a less
benign history to the duck test, tracing its roots to a McCarthy era
anti-Communist labor union activist, quoted as saying in the height of
the “Red Scare” targeting perceived Communists in the United
States, “A door-opener for the Communist party is worse than a
1.

See Walczak v. Labor Works-Fort Wayne LLC, 983 N.E.2d 1146, 1148
n.1 (Ind. 2013) (citing MICHAEL HEIM, EXPLORING INDIANA
HIGHWAYS: TRIP TRIVIA 68 (2007)).

1074

Case Western Reserve Law Review· Volume 64· Issue 3·2014
When Quacking Like a Duck Is Really a Swan Song in Disguise

member of the Communist party. When someone walks like a duck,
swims like a duck, and quacks like a duck, he’s a duck.”2
In retrospect, it is now well known that not everyone who was
charged with quacking like a Communist during the McCarthy Era
was in fact a Communist—far from it.3 The Red Scare highlighted the
reality that things are often not what they seem. Indeed, as history
has revealed after the fact, even those who persecuted perceived
Communists in the McCarthy Era were, themselves, not what they
seemed—patriotic Americans protecting liberty. Rather, they were
misguided (to put it kindly) politicians who violated the
constitutional rights and liberties of those they charged as antiAmerican Communists.4
Which is to say, not to ruffle the feathers of any patriotic
Communist-hating duck hunters, but the “walks like a duck, quacks
like a duck” adage is one that should not be used liberally but should
be taken with a grain of context and awareness of its malleability.
This Article explores a different context for the application of the
duck test: United States v. Windsor,5 the Supreme Court’s historic
marriage equality decision striking down Section 3 of the Defense of
Marriage Act (DOMA), which codified a federal definition of marriage
that excluded same-sex couples, even if their marriages were

2.

See, e.g., id. (citing THE YALE BOOK OF QUOTATIONS 131 (Fred R.
Shapiro ed., 2006) (attributing quote to labor union activist James B.
Carey)). But c.f. MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. Pac. Bell, No. 96-02-014,
1997 WL 868363 at *5 (Cal. Pub. Cont. Oct. 9, 1997) (“It might be
thought that this case presents the perfect application for the wellknown ‘duck test’ originally proposed by the labor leader Walter
Reuther.”); Appellate Petition for Review at *5 n.10, Denny’s Inc. v.
Workers’ Compensation Appeals Bd., 2003 WL 23017886 (Cal. 2003)
(No. S113539) (“The quote is sometimes attributed to Walter Reuther
(1907-1970), American labor leader in the ’30s who is said to have made
the remark in response to a journalist’s question of how to spot a
communist.”).

3.

See, e.g., Brief of Amici Curiae Victims of the McCarthy Era, In
Support of Humanitarian Law Project et al. at 7, Holder v.
Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1 (2010) (Nos. 08–1498, 09–89)
(“In their investigations of more than four million federal civilian
employees, the government’s two hundred loyalty boards did not
uncover a single instance of actual espionage or subversive malfeasance”
(citing Geoffrey R. Stone, Perilous Times: Free Speech in
Wartime: From the Sedition Act of 1798 to the War on
Terrorism 351 (2004))).

4.

See generally Elfbrandt v. Russell, 384 U.S. 11 (1966) (holding
unconstitutional an Arizona statute that effectively criminalized
membership in subversive organizations by public employees).

5.

133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013).

1075

Case Western Reserve Law Review· Volume 64· Issue 3·2014
When Quacking Like a Duck Is Really a Swan Song in Disguise

recognized in their states of domicile.6 In Windsor, Edie Windsor, the
surviving widow in a same-sex marriage that was recognized in the
couple’s home state, was slapped with a $363,053 estate tax bill after
her partner died, pursuant to DOMA’s requirement that only
opposite-sex marriages be recognized as valid under federal law.7 Had
Edie’s spouse been a man and their marriage recognized as valid
under federal law, Edie would not have been taxed for the marital
estate. After she unsuccessfully sought relief from the IRS, Edie
brought a federal lawsuit seeking a refund and challenging the
constitutionality of DOMA on equal protection grounds under the
Fifth Amendment.8
In contrast with the Windsor action, another lawsuit challenging
Section 3 of DOMA had also raised Tenth Amendment and Spending
Clause claims.9 As described in this Article, asserting Tenth
Amendment challenges to DOMA was an approach that appealed to
some who viewed federalism challenges to the Act as strategically
savvy in a minimalist appealing-to-conservatives way. Although Edie
Windsor did not similarly assert a Tenth Amendment challenge to
DOMA on federalism grounds, the Supreme Court’s final decision in
her favor did contain a passage addressing the general legislative
authority of states to set marriage laws.10 This inclusion of a state
powers passage in the majority opinion led some to view the decision
as a federalist decision that renders the authority to define and
regulate marriage exclusively a matter of state prerogative.11
6.

1 U.S.C. § 7 (2012) (“In determining the meaning of any Act of
Congress, or of any ruling, regulation, or interpretation of the various
administrative bureaus and agencies of the United States, the word
‘marriage’ means only a legal union between one man and one woman as
husband and wife, and the word ‘spouse’ refers only to a person of the
opposite sex who is a husband or a wife.”), invalidated by Windsor, 133
S. Ct. 2675.

7.

133 S. Ct. at 2683.

8.

Amended Complaint ¶¶ 82–85, at 21–22, United States v. Windsor, 833
F. Supp. 2d 394 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (No. 10 Civ. 8435 (BSJ) (JCF).

9.

Complaint ¶¶ 80–98, at 22–24, Massachusetts v. U.S. Dep’t of Health &
Human Servs., 698 F. Supp. 2d 234 (D. Mass. 2010) (No. 1:09-11156JLT).

10.

Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2691–93.

11.

Except as otherwise noted (for example, in section I.B., supra,
addressing the various meanings of “federalism” in more detail), I use
the terms “federalist” and “federalism” throughout this article neither in
their neutral sense, i.e., as a general reference to the tensions between
federal and state power, nor as referencing the original approach to
federalism as endorsed by the Federalist Party—with which the
Supreme Court’s early Chief Justice Marshall was aligned—that favored
strong, centralized federal power and emphasized the supremacy of
federal law in vertical conflicts of power. See, e.g., McCulloch v.
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This Article reveals the flaws of such readings of Windsor that
erroneously conflate Windsor’s discussion of state legislative authority
with the endorsement of a broader federalism doctrine that would
allow states to deny marriage rights to entire classifications of people,
unchecked by even federal judicial review. Such broad, unchecked
federalism is anathema to the protection of constitutional rights, as it
would leave some fundamental individual rights up to majority will.
Moreover, such broad, unchecked federalism is not actually endorsed
by the majority opinion in Windsor, its state powers passage
notwithstanding, as revealed by a careful reading of the opinion.
Metaphorically, this Article explains how the duck test, if applied
to Windsor, would not render it a federalist decision, despite being so
labeled by dissenters in that case and by others. Rather, despite
appearing to quack like a federalist duck, ultimately, Windsor is, in
effect, something else entirely: a swan song setting the stage for the
eventual demise of federalist-based marriage discrimination.
In support of this thesis, Part I of this Article describes the
history of same-sex marriage litigation, with a particular focus on the
influence of last century’s “minimalist” movement in steering LGBT
litigants away from asserting broad constitutional claims in court for
a number of years.12 The Article details how the minimalist movement
alternatively advocated a federalism-focused approach toward
attacking DOMA, as a means of narrowly garnering the five Supreme
Court votes needed to win the case. Part II describes how some
Court-watchers consequently viewed Windsor as a “federalist”
decision when it was released. However, this section further explains
why Windsor is not, in fact, a federalist decision but is, rather, an
individual rights decision. Part III offers a somewhat cynical
Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). Under that view, the Tenth
Amendment, while recognizing unenumerated powers of individuals and
states, does not create exclusive provinces of state legislation with which
the federal government may not intervene. See United States v.
Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 645–52 (2000) (Souter, J., dissenting); Hodel v.
Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass’n, Inc., 452 U.S. 264, 286–88
(1981). Rather, “federalist” and “federalism” in this article are used to
reflect the opposite usage of the terms in more recent years, referring to
the modern conservative reference to “federalism” as incorporating
preference of strong sovereign state powers, including the view that
there are zones of exclusively state legislative control under the Tenth
Amendment. See, e.g., Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 42–43 (2005)
(O’Connor, J., dissenting); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 585
(1995) (Thomas, J., concurring).
12.

Professor Cass R. Sunstein, the most visible proponent of modern
minimalism, has not offered a clear or consistent definition of the term
but generally identifies it as relating to the narrowness and shallowness
of a judicial approach. Neil S. Siegel, A Theory in Search of a Court,
and Itself: Judicial Minimalism at the Supreme Court Bar, 103 Mich.
L. Rev. 1951, 1961–62 (2005).
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explanation of the state powers passage of the Windsor opinion,
suggesting that Justice Anthony Kennedy’s inclusion of federalism
overtones in the majority opinion is strategic artifice that deliberately
masks the decision’s broader purpose of using federalism against
itself—i.e., engaging federalism-sounding principles only to ultimately
dismantle federalism-based marriage discrimination. Windsor is
compared to other instances in history in which powerful rhetoric has
been used to mask the fact that the speaker’s end goal is the opposite
of what a surface reading of the speaker’s words might indicate.
However, Parts IV and V then counteroffer a less cynical reading of
Windsor, concluding that rather than indicating some type of artifice
or intentional misdirection, Windsor’s analysis, even with its
tangential state powers discussion and narrowing language, is
doctrinally solid and in line with the Court’s past individual
rights decisions.
Windsor is but the latest layer of a growing foundation of equal
liberty jurisprudence, established with deliberate doctrinal integrity to
ensure greater protections for individual rights over time as both
society and the courts become more enlightened.13 To some extent,
foundation-building jurisprudence may reflect a type of minimalism
urged by some Court-watchers over the years in its paced and
deliberate tone. However, to a greater extent, Windsor, like its
predecessors, is a broad affirmation of evolving constitutional
principles that serves as a doctrinally powerful precedent for future,
potentially more sweeping, affirmations of equal LGBT rights and
liberty interests under the Constitution.

13.

As Thomas Jefferson wrote, and as inscribed on the ceiling of the
Jefferson Memorial Rotunda,
[L]aws and institutions must go hand and hand with the
progress of the human mind. As that becomes more developed,
more enlightened, as new discoveries are made, new truths
disclosed, and manners and opinions change with the change of
circumstances, institutions must advance also, and keep pace
with the times. We might as well require a man to wear still the
coat which fitted him when a boy, as civilized society to remain
ever under the regimen of their barbarous ancestors.
Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Samuel Kercheval (July 12, 1816), in
15 The Writings of Thomas Jefferson 32, 41 (Albert Ellery
Bergh ed., 1905); see also Schneiderman v. United States, 320 U.S. 118,
137 n.15 (1943); Nancy C. Marcus, Beyond Romer and Lawrence: The
Right to Privacy Comes Out of the Closet, 15 COLUM. J. GENDER & L.
355, 364 & n.46 (2006).
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I. The Minimalist Movement’s Influence on
Federalism-Focused Strategy in DOMA Challenges
The arguments made in DOMA litigation and other LGBT rights
cases should be understood in context of the caution LGBT rights
advocates felt leading up to the Supreme Court’s same-sex marriage
cases. The sting of past political backlash kindled a fear not just of
losing, but also of winning, into the hearts of those convinced that, for
example, George W. Bush won re-election due to political backlash in
response to judicial decisions favoring marriage equality.14 As a result,
LGBT rights advocates largely stayed out of federal court in the years
following the 2004 election.
As litigants finally began mounting federal challenges to DOMA,
some advocates remained cautious, favoring arguments they thought
to be the safest politically, over more doctrinally ambitious
arguments. This Part describes how that caution was expressed
through the flirtation with federalism in some advocates’ and scholars’
proposed approaches to overturning DOMA. Perhaps because of such
expectations that DOMA would be decided on federalist grounds,
even after Windsor was issued on individual rights grounds, it was
nonetheless interpreted as a federalist decision by some Courtwatchers and even some members of the Court itself who fell on the
dissenting side of Windsor.
A. Backlash Fears and Hollow Hopes:
The Movement Toward Minimalism

Prior to the Proposition 815 and DOMA16 decisions by the
Supreme Court, there was widespread reluctance to bring a same-sex
marriage case to federal court for fear of losing and setting bad
precedent.17 The devastating negative impact of the anti-LGBT
14.

See, e.g., Carolyn Lochhead, Gay Marriage: Did Issue Help Re-elect
Bush?, S.F. Chronicle, Nov. 4, 2004, at A1, A16.

15.

Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013) (striking down on
standing grounds, California’s Proposition 8, which banned same-sex
marriages in California in response to a court decision that allowed
thousands of same-sex couples in California to wed).

16.

Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675.

17.

See, e.g., Jane S. Schacter, Making Sense of the Marriage Debate, 91
TEX. L. REV. 1185, 1199 (2013) (reviewing MICHAEL J. KLARMAN,
FROM THE CLOSET TO THE ALTAR: COURTS, BACKLASH, AND THE
STRUGGLE FOR SAME-SEX MARRIAGE (2013)) (describing “the express
design of LGBT-rights litigators, who elected to stay out of federal court
for nearly twenty years”); Maura Dolan, Battles Brew as Gay Marriage
Ban Is Upheld, L.A. Times, May 27, 2009, at A1, A12 (“Gay rights
lawyers have urged supporters to stay out of federal court, fearful of a
U.S. Supreme Court ruling that could set the same-sex marriage
movement back decades.”).
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Bowers v. Hardwick18 decision was, after all, still fresh in the minds of
many, even after it was overturned by Lawrence v. Texas.19
Among some LGBT-rights advocates, there was also a fear of
winning, because of the negative repercussions that might ensue. The
risk of harmful political backlash seemed most evident in the years
when anti-LGBT constitutional amendments were succeeding at the
ballot following two state supreme court decisions affirming marriage
rights of LGBT individuals and same-sex couples, the Hawaii
Supreme Court case Baehr v. Lewin20 and, a decade later, the
Massachusetts Supreme Court case Goodridge v. Department of
Public Health,21 which was decided the same year as the Supreme
Court’s Lawrence decision. In addition to Congress enacting DOMA,
between 1996 and 2005, the majority of states either enacted miniDOMA statutes or amended their state constitutions to prohibit
same-sex marriage.22
Despite this temporary legislative backlash, in the span of the
twenty years between 1993 and 2013, opinion polls reflected an overall
increasing trajectory of support for same-sex marriage rights and
LGBT equality. Nationwide support of same-sex marriage rose from
around 20% in support of marriage in 199323 to 54–57% in support in
the second half of 2013.24 Comparative studies of polls over the years
have conclusively demonstrated “that the public is growing
18.

478 U.S. 186 (1986), overruled by Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558
(2003).

19.

539 U.S. 558 (2003).

20.

852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993).

21.

798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003).

22.

Jane S. Schacter, Sexual Orientation, Social Change, and the Courts, 54
DRAKE L. REV. 861, 879 (2006). Twenty-three states passed laws
prohibiting same-sex marriage and recognizing same-sex marriages
performed elsewhere while eighteen states added similar constitutional
amendments. Id. at 869.

23.

Patrick J. Egan & Nathaniel Persily, Court Decisions and Trends in
Support for Same-Sex Marriage, POLLING REPORT fig.1 (Aug. 17,
2009), http://www.pollingreport.com/penp0908.htm.

24.

Susan Page, Same-Sex Marriage at Record Approval, USA Today, July
2, 2013, at 1A (showing that 55% of Americans approve of same-sex
marriage); Press Release, Quinnipiac Univ. Polling Instit., U.S.
Catholics Back Pope On Changing Church Focus, Quinnipiac University
National Poll Finds; Catholics Support Gay Marriage, Women Priests
2–1, 3 (Oct. 4, 2013) http://www.quinnipiac.edu/images/polling/us/
us10042013_er9hjp.pdf/ (56% of all adults, 60% of Catholics, and 57%
of registered voters); Lydia Saad, In U.S., 52% Back Law to Legalize
Gay Marriage in 50 States, GALLUP, (July 29, 2013), http://www.
gallup.com/poll/163730/back-law-legalize-gay-marriage-states.aspx
(“54% think gay marriages should be recognized as valid, with the same
rights as marriages between men and women.”).
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increasingly more amenable to same-sex marriage and that judicial
decisions are unlikely to reverse that trend.”25
By 2011, even the head of Focus on the Family had conceded that
the organization, arguably the largest group of organized same-sex
marriage opponents in the country, had lost the battle to keep
marriage defined as solely between a man and a woman, stating the
following in an interview:
We’re losing on that one, especially among the 20- and 30somethings: 65 to 70 percent of them favor same-sex marriage. I
don’t know if that’s going to change with a little more age—
demographers would say probably not. We’ve probably lost
that. I don’t want to be extremist here, but I think we need to
start calculating where we are in the culture.26

As more court-watchers and political analysts began to conclude,
the early marriage opinions, if anything, should actually be credited
with “start[ing] a process that culminated in same-sex couples
securing widespread relationship protections.”27 Professor Tom
Goldstein describes the recent Supreme Court LGBT rights cases as
having sent the “moral message . . . that these unions are entitled to
equal respect. . . . [T]hat is probably the lasting legacy of the
decisions and is probably going to play a significant role in public
opinion.”28
Not only has the acceptance of same-sex marriage risen
substantially in public polling, but the number of states recognizing
same-sex unions rose dramatically as well in the decade between the
2003 Goodridge decision and the 2013 Windsor decision. In that time,
a dozen states and the District of Columbia legalized same-sex
marriage.29 By the end of 2013, only six months after Windsor,
eighteen jurisdictions in the United States granted recognition to
same-sex unions or had voted to do so.30 This tally does not even
25.

Egan & Persily, supra note 23; see also Patrick J. Egan, Nathaniel
Persily & Kevin Wallsten, Gay Rights, in PUBLIC OPINION AND
CONSTITUTIONAL CONTROVERSY 234–66 (Nathaniel Persily et al. eds.,
2008).

26.

See Marvin Olasky, Q&A, Refocused, WORLD, June 4, 2011, at 28, 28
(interviewing Jim Daly, CEO & President, Focus on the Family).

27.

E.g., Schacter, supra note 22, at 871.

28.

Page, supra note 24, at 1A.

29.

United States v. Windsor, 2675, 2689 (2013).

30.

Those states, in addition to the District of Columbia (D.C. CODE § 46401 (LexisNexis Supp. 2013)), included California (In re Marriage Cases,
183 P.3d 384 (Cal. 2008), superseded by constitutional amendment, Cal.
Const. art. I, § 7.5, as recognized in Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct.
2652 (2013)); Connecticut (Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub. Health, 957
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include the numerous other localities and several states that
additionally provided same-sex partnership recognition through civil
unions or domestic partnerships by then.
In contrast, two decades before, when DOMA was enacted in the
aftermath of Baehr and Goodridge, no state had yet granted same-sex
marriage rights.31
Regardless, at least before the Court had issued four pro-LGBT
rights opinions—Romer v. Evans,32 Lawrence v. Texas, Hollingsworth
v. Perry33 and United States v. Windsor—some LGBT-rights activists
blamed their movement’s judicial victories for its legislative defeats
and perceived public backlash. They lamented that the public had not
been ready for judicial affirmations of constitutional rights for LGBT
citizens, and that the backlash resulting from such victories was not
worth the victories themselves. Their warnings urging LGBT litigants
away from pursuing their day in court to protect their constitutional
rights were fueled by an academic call for minimalism spearheaded by
Gerald Rosenberg’s influential book, The Hollow Hope,34 and

A.2d 407 (Conn. 2008)); Delaware (DEL. CODE ANN. tit.13, § 129
(Supp. 2013)); Hawaii (HAW. REV. STAT. § 572-1 (2012)); Illinois
(Religious Freedom and Fairness Act, ch. 20, para. 201, 209, 212, 220,
2013 Ill. Legis. Serv. 4128–30 (West), (to be codified at ILL. COMP.
STAT. §§ 750-5/201, /209, /212, /220 (Supp. 2014))); Iowa (Varnum v.
Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862 (Iowa 2009)); Maine (ME. REV. STAT. tit. Ann.
tit. 22, § 2710 (Supp. 2013)), Maryland (MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW
§ 2-201 (LexisNexis 2012) (effective Jan. 1, 2013)); Massachusetts
(Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003) and
In re Ops. of the Justices to the Senate, 802 N.E.2d 565 (Mass. 2004));
Minnesota (Minn. Stat. Ann. § 517.03 (Supp. 2014)); Nevada (NEV.
REV. STAT. §§ 122A.010–122A.510 (LexisNexis 2010), amended by Nev.
Rev. Stat. §§ 122A.100, .500 (LexisNexis Supp. 2013)); New
Hampshire (N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 457:1-a (Supp. 2013); New Jersey
(Garden State Equal. v. Dow, L-1729-11, 2013 WL 6153269 (N.J. Super.
Ct. Law Div. Sept. 27), stay denied, 79 A.3d 479 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law
Div.), cert. granted, 75 A.3d 1157 (N.J.), and stay denied, 79 A.3d 1036
(N.J. 2013)); New Mexico (N.M. STAT. Ann. § 40-1-4 (LexisNexis
2004) (honoring marriages performed out of state)); New York (N.Y.
DOM. REL. LAW § 10-a (McKinney Supp. 2014); Rhode Island (R.I.
GEN. LAWS § 15-1-1 (2013); Vermont (VT. STAT. ANN. tit.15, § 8
(2010); and Washington (WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.04.010
(West Supp. 2013)).
31.

See Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2682.

32.

517 U.S. 620 (1996) (striking down Colorado’s Amendment 2, which had
in effect prohibited all civil rights protections for gays and bisexuals).

33.

133. S. Ct. 2652 (2013).

34.

GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING
ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? (1991) [hereinafter THE HOLLOW HOPE].

1082

Case Western Reserve Law Review· Volume 64· Issue 3·2014
When Quacking Like a Duck Is Really a Swan Song in Disguise

echoed by legal scholars such as Cass Sunstein and Michael
Klarman.35
The original 1991 version of The Hollow Hope cautions
against oppressed minorities seeking social reform through litigation,
contending that the judiciary is, and should be, constrained by
political considerations.36 During the heyday of The Hollow Hope’s
popularity among social justice lawyers at the turn of the century,
Cass Sunstein frequently cited the book to urge a more minimalist
view of the federal courts’ appropriate role in affecting social change.37
In the context of LGBT rights specifically, Sunstein cited The
Hollow Hope to discourage LGBT litigants from bringing equalprotection claims to court, writing, “even if discrimination on the
basis of sexual orientation is often a violation of the Equal Protection
Clause, courts should be cautious and selective in vindicating that
principle.”38 Sunstein warned, for example, that if the Supreme Court
issued a marriage equality opinion too soon,
35.

See infra notes 35, 38, 40, 42, 44, and 46.

36.

See, e.g., THE HOLLOW HOPE, supra note 34, at 343 (“In assuming that
courts can overcome political obstacles, and produce change without
mobilization and participation, reformers both reified and removed
courts from the political and economic system in which they operate.”).

37.

See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Liberal Constitutionalism and Liberal
Justice, 72 TEX. L. REV. 305, 308–09 (1993) (urging judges to exercise
more modesty and recognize that due in part to their lack of “a good
electoral pedigree,” they should not attempt “to bring about significant
social reform on their own” but instead recognize that “constitutional
rights are judicially ‘underenforced,’ and properly so, because of the
courts’ distinctive limitations.”) (emphasis added); see also Cass R.
Sunstein, One Case at a Time: Judicial Minimalism on the
Supreme Court (1999); Cass R. Sunstein, Black on Brown, 90 VA. L.
REV. 1649, 1649 n.3 (2004) (additionally citing to Mark Tushnet,
Taking the Constitution Away from the Courts (1999) and Cass
R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, Interpretation and Institutions, 101
MICH. L. REV. 885 (2003)); Cass R. Sunstein, Constitutional Caution,
1996 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 361, 361 & n.2 (1996) (“Supreme Court
decisions may be counterproductive. If it is understood as a case about
gender equality, Roe v. Wade is a possible example since the Court’s
decision may well have damaged the effort to produce gender
equality.”); Cass R. Sunstein, From Theory to Practice, 29 ARIZ. ST.
L.J. 389, 394 (1997) (arguing that in the context of abortion rights, the
Court failed to be cognizant of its institutional limits and “ought not to
have invoked ambitious abstractions about privacy or liberty to resolve
so many issues so quickly”); Cass R. Sunstein, Essay, Public
Deliberation, Affirmative Action, and the Supreme Court, 84 CAL. L.
REV. 1179, 1179, 1182 & n.11 (1996) (arguing affirmative action should
be left to popular vote, not judicial decision, as a matter of pragmatism
and principle).

38.

Cass R. Sunstein, Homosexuality and the Constitution, 70 IND. L.J. 1,
25 (1994).
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[I]t might cause a constitutional crisis, a weakening of the
legitimacy of the Court, an intensifying of homophobia, a
constitutional amendment overturning the Court’s decision, and
much more. Any Court, even one committed to the basic
principle [of equal protection], should hesitate in the face of such
prospects. It would be far better for the Court to start
cautiously and to proceed incrementally.39

These minimalist arguments urging civil rights advocates to
eschew federal courts as agents for social justice, and, alternatively,
advocating incremental over broad social change, continued generally
even after the retirement of Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, who was
widely perceived as a minimalist and who seems to have been the
target of a substantial amount of minimalism scholarship.40
In the arena of LGBT rights, the push toward minimalism
continued even after the first two LGBT-rights Supreme Court
victories, Lawrence v. Texas and Romer v. Evans.41 Klarman, for
example, wrote in 2005 that “[b]y outpacing public opinion on issues
of social reform,” such rulings mobilize opponents, undercut
moderates, and retard the cause they purport to advance.”42 That
39.

Id. at 26.

40.

See, e.g., Robert Anderson IV, Measuring Meta-Doctrine: An Empirical
Assessment of Judicial Minimalism in the Supreme Court, 32 HARV.
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1045, 1082 (2009) (describing O’Connor as a
“minimalist by all measures”); Louis D. Bilionis, Grand Centrism and
the Centrist Judicial Personam, 83 N.C. L. REV. 1353, 1353–54 (2005)
(“Justice O’Connor is the exemplary practitioner of the style of judging
that likely comes to mind most often when Court watchers and
constitutional law cognoscenti allude to judicial centrism—what I will
call here, with no claim to originality and a standing reference to the
work of Cass Sunstein, ‘minimalist centrism.’”); Steve France, Opinions
with Style: Scholar Says Court Has Embraced O’Connor’s
“Minimalism,” A.B.A. J., Sept. 1999, at 38, 38 (describing Cass
Sunstein and Sandra Day O’Connor as an “odd couple” for their
minimalist views); Sarah Krakoff, Undoing Indian Law One Case at a
Time: Judicial Minimalism and Tribal Sovereignty, 50 AM. U. L. REV.
1177, 1189–90 (2001) (footnotes omitted) (“Justice O’Connor in
particular, like Justice Ginsburg, seems to embody minimalism’s
purported virtues. O’Connor never articulates broad rules, opting
instead for context-based balancing tests. She is particularly deferential
to precedent. She is, to some commentators, frustrating precisely
because of her reluctance to endorse deep justifications.”); Cass R.
Sunstein, Burkean Minimalism, 105 MICH. L. REV. 353, 356 (2006) (“In
the nation’s history, Justices Felix Frankfurter and Sandra Day
O’Connor have been the most prominent practitioners of Burkean
minimalism, in the sense that they have tended to favor small steps and
close attention to both experience and tradition.”).

41.

517 U.S. 620 (1996).

42.

Michael J. Klarman, Brown and Lawrence (and Goodridge), 104 MICH.
L. REV. 431, 482 (2005).
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said, by 2013, Klarman had reversed himself and substantially
softened his opposition to same-sex marriage equality litigation. As
Professor Schacter’s review of Klarman’s book on the history of samesex marriage litigation describes:
Although Klarman covers much of the same ground in the
book and alludes to the same factors in explaining the backlash,
there is a noticeable change of tone and conclusion from the
earlier article. In the book, Klarman is much less committed to
a negative assessment of litigating for same-sex marriage at a
time when public opinion was not supportive. Indeed, having
explored both the costs and benefits of litigation, he concludes
in the book that, “[o]n balance, litigation has probably advanced
the cause of gay marriage more than it has retarded it.” And, to
a much greater degree than he did in his earlier work, Klarman
recognizes that “[l]itigation put gay marriage on the table,” and
that, had early litigation not made marriage salient, it is
“unlikely that more than 50 percent of Americans would
support gay marriage in 2012.” To his credit, Klarman notes
expressly in the book that some of his views have changed.
Klarman is not alone in having perspectives on the marriage
controversy that have “evolved,” and I think his candor about it
is admirable. Indeed, the fact that the marriage debate has
moved so quickly, and public support for marriage equality risen
so rapidly, has created a challenge for scholars analyzing the
debate in real time. At a minimum, the fast pace of change
means that it is wise for anyone studying the issues to revisit
and reassess, rather than clinging to earlier expressed opinions.43

Cass Sunstein also backtracked somewhat from his original
minimalism, ironically distancing himself from the minimalist
movement he helped to create. In 2008, for example, he wrote that
that minimalism is often “a terrible blunder,”44 and he
condescendingly mocked minimalists for possessing “characteristic
timidity” or even “cowardice.”45 Instead of criticizing broad decisions,
he offered praise for broad, sweeping adjudication of social justice
issues, concluding that cases such as “Brown v. Board of Education,
New York Times Company v. Sullivan[, and] Brandenburg v.
Ohio . . . deserve celebration, not lament.”46

43.

Schacter, supra note 17, at 1193–94 (quoting Klarman, supra note 17,
at 208, 218).

44.

Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond Judicial Minimalism, 43 TULSA L. REV. 825,
825 (2008).

45.

Id. at 827.

46.

Id. at 841 (footnotes omitted).
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However, Sunstein’s newfound respect for broad judicial civil
rights decisions was not absolute, as evidenced in that very same
article. Even after Romer and Lawrence, he continued to advocate
minimalism as the preferred approach in some contexts, including
same-sex marriage. Specifically, he wrote:
Frequently ordinary people disagree in some deep way on an
issue—what to do in the Middle East, pornography, same-sex
marriages, the war on terror—and sometimes they agree not to
discuss that issue much, as a way of deferring to each other’s
strong convictions and showing a measure of reciprocity and
respect (even if they do not at all respect the particular
conviction that is at stake). If reciprocity and mutual respect
are desirable, it follows that public officials or judges, perhaps
even more than ordinary people, should not challenge their
fellow citizens’ deepest and most defining commitments, at least
if those commitments are reasonable and if there is no need for
them to do so. Indeed, we can see a kind of political charity in
the refusal to contest those commitments when life can proceed
without any such contest.47

Such a dismissive statement that life goes on (“life can proceed”) even
if same-sex couples are denied judicial protections against marriage
discrimination, and that it might actually be charitable to deny them
their day in court, might give same-sex marriage proponents pause in
following Sunstein’s litigation strategy advice. At the very least, it
reflects that he is less receptive toward LGBT claims than to other
civil rights claims as appropriate subjects of constitutional litigation.
Staying even more doggedly true to his original position is The
Hollow Hope’s author, Rosenberg, who in a 2006 article wrote,
“[t]he battle for same-sex marriage would have been better served if
they had never brought litigation, or had lost their cases.”48 Then, in
2008, Rosenberg added a supplement to The Hollow Hope
devoted solely to extending his pessimistic attitude toward judicial
review to the context of same-sex marriage, with one chapter titled
“Confusing Rights with Reality.”49 In the final section of the 2008
supplement, even more contemptuously titled, “When Will They Ever
Learn?,” Rosenberg insisted that same-sex marriage advocates had
“clearly” not succeeded but had gone to court too soon and had
“confused the rhetoric of rights with the reality of reaction.”50 He
47.

Id. at 832–33.

48.

Gerald N. Rosenberg, Courting Disaster: Looking for Change in All the
Wrong Places, 54 Drake L. Rev. 795, 813 (2006).

49.

GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING
ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? 355–429 (2d. ed. 2008).

50.

Id. at 415–19.
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lambasted same-sex marriage litigants and attorneys, accusing them
of “leaping beyond what the American public could bear,” thereby
setting back their own cause.51 Rosenberg continued these attacks on
marriage equality litigation in a 2009 later article as well,52 despite the
increasing support for marriage equality strongly evident in polls by
then,53 writing that same-sex marriage litigation “set back [the] goal of
marriage equality for at least a generation.”54
In recent years, Sunstein’s comparatively restrained but persistent
defense of minimalism in the context of same-sex marriage,
Rosenberg’s pessimistic and stridently hollow same-sex marriage
predictions, and other minimalist “Backlash Theorists” are being
drowned out by the more optimistic and forward-thinking “Backlash
Skeptics,” as dubbed by Michael D. Sant’Ambrogio & Sylvia A.
Law.55 In contrast with the “Backlash Theorists” such as Sunstein,
Rosenberg, and the older incarnation of Klarman, the “Backlash
Skeptics” (including the now-LGBT-litigation-friendly Klarman)
argue that litigation remains an effective and important tool for social
change, including in the context of same-sex marriage.56 The same
cases Backlash Theorists charge with causing backlash are, it is
increasingly recognized, actually responsible in part for the growing
popular acceptance of same-sex marriage, increased legislative
protections for LGBT individuals and same-sex couples in other
contexts, and a dramatic rise in the number of states with
relationship protections for same-sex couples.57
Since the Backlash Theorists’ pessimistic predictions of continued
backlash and defeat for same-sex marriage advocates failed to come to
fruition in, or after, Windsor, Sunstein has described Windsor in
mixed terms. On the one hand, while conceding in a 2013 Internet
post that “Windsor isn’t exactly a minimalist decision,” he critically
describes Windsor as emphasizing “an unruly mixture of

51.

See id. (criticizing same-sex marriage proponents for not employing an
incremental strategy).

52.

Gerald N. Rosenberg, Saul Alinsky and the Litigation Campaign to Win
the Right to Same-Sex Marriage, 42 J. Marshall L. Rev. 643 (2009).

53.

See Egan & Persily, supra note 23.

54.

Rosenberg, supra note 52, at 656.

55.

See Michael D. Sant’Ambrogio & Sylvia A. Law, Baehr v. Lewin and
the Long Road to Marriage Equality, 33 U. Haw. L. Rev. 705, 744–48
(2011).

56.

See id. at 746 (“Change will come in most of these places only, if at all,
through federal court intervention.”).

57.

Id. at 747–48.
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constitutional concerns,” which “leave[s] a great deal undecided.”58 On
the other hand, he then softens his tone toward Windsor, ultimately
describing it as a decision reflecting appropriate judicial restraint in
“resting its ruling on the foundation of human dignity.”59
As for Rosenberg, he fell silent in the aftermath of Windsor. It
remains to be seen whether in his future writings he will continue to
try to dismiss the issue of same-sex marriage inequality as one that
civil rights advocates should not have turned to the courts to resolve.
If, even after Windsor, he continues to wish failure upon marriage
equality litigators60 and to charge same-sex marriage litigants with
“set[ting] back [the] goal of marriage equality for at least a
generation,”61 he is not likely to have much of a chorus of supporting
followers any longer, at least among LGBT rights advocates.
As of this Article’s writing, there have been no law journal
articles from LGBT rights/marriage equality advocates citing
Rosenberg or Sunstein, or Klarman’s older writings, to argue, for
example, that LGBT rights litigators should continue taking a more
minimalist approach and refrain from turning to the courts to secure
equal rights, or warning of post-Windsor backlash.
In place of the Backlash Theorists, the Backlash Skeptics are now
becoming more prominent in the same-sex marriage litigation strategy
dialogue, rising above the hollowness of The Hollow Hope and
urging a new, more optimistic, look at the appropriate role of the
Courts in protecting civil rights through judicial review. However,
leading up to the Windsor litigation, some still clung to the
cautionary words of The Hollow Hope and the corresponding
minimalist backlash theory movement, as described in the following
section.
B.

How the Minimalist Movement Led to a Push for
Federalist Anti-DOMA Arguments

As marriage equality challenges approached the Supreme Court,
the minimalist movement continued its chorus of what Professors
Lawrence Tribe and Joshua Matz have described as a “comparative
harmony of gradualism [that] holds sway, a tense balance between the
undoubted benefits of marriage equality litigation and the real danger
that a boldly liberal ruling could set our country ablaze at just the
58.

Cass R. Sunstein, Gay-Marriage Ruling Safeguards Human Dignity,
BLOOMBERG (June 26, 2013, 4:15 PM ET), http://www.bloomberg.com
/news/2013-06-26/gay-marriage-ruling-safeguards-human-dignity.html.

59.

Id.

60.

Rosenberg, supra note 48, at 813 (“The battle for same sex-marriage
would have been better served if [same-sex marriage advocates] had
never brought litigation, or had lost their cases.”).

61.

Rosenberg, supra note 52, at 656.
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wrong moment.”62 Minimalists warned that a marriage inequality
ruling could result in the type of backlash that was “unleashed with
terrible force after Goodridge v. Department of Public Health.”63
To avoid either losing completely or winning too big and sparking
such a backlash, some LGBT rights advocates favored a careful
minimalist strategy in attacking DOMA. They envisioned reaching
the goal of securing at least five votes from the Supreme Court
justices through a restrained decision on narrow federalism grounds
that might appeal to a majority of the justices.64
Minimalism advocates who embraced federalist arguments as a
strategically savvy, narrow means of overturning DOMA had their
support in a number of scholars who did not themselves identify as
“minimalist,” but who nonetheless saw the potential for a successful
federalist challenge to DOMA.65 Federalism, after all, offered a
tempting avenue of argument that might appeal to a majority of
Justices, while allowing the Court the “out” of issuing a ruling more

62.

See Laurence H. Tribe & Joshua Matz, An Ephemeral Moment:
Minimalism, Equality, and Federalism in the Struggle for Same-Sex
Marriage Rights, 37 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 199, 202 (2013)
(comparing today’s reaction with the backlash after Goodrich v.
Department of Public Health).

63.

Id.

64.

See Adam E. Brauner & Andreas J. Meyer, A Closer Look at the
Marriage Equality Cases Before the United States Supreme Court,
Orange County Law, May 2013, at 18 (“In the case of Windsor,
LGBT activists across the country are optimistic, perhaps because
multiple avenues to a positive outcome seem to exist, including ones
that are consistent with conservative legal ideologies. For example, it
has been suggested that certain members of the Court’s conservative
wing, such as Chief Justice John Roberts or Justice Clarence Thomas,
may vote to overturn the law on federalism grounds, like some
conservative judges in lower courts have done in other cases.”).

65.

See, e.g., William Baude, Beyond DOMA: Choice of State Law in
Federal Statutes, 64 Stan. L. Rev. 1371, 1379 (2012) (“Indeed, many of
DOMA’s critics have articulated the attack in federalist terms.”) (citing,
in part, David B. Cruz, Essay, The Defense of Marriage Act and
Uncategorical Federalism, 19 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 805, 815–23
(2011), and Evan Wolfson & Michael F. Melcher, Constitutional and
Legal Defects in the “Defense of Marriage” Act, 16 Quinnipiac L. Rev.
221, 231–39 (1996)). See also Mark Strasser, DOMA and the Two Faces
of Federalism, 32 Creighton L. Rev. 457 (1998) (“In its haste to pass
DOMA and to put the President in a politically unpalatable position,
Congress did not adequately take into account the potential
constitutional ramifications of DOMA and its threat to our federalist
system.”).

.
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moderate and narrow in tone than a decision based, for example, on
substantive due process.66
Some litigants consequently chose to base their DOMA challenge
on federalist grounds, with some success in Massachusetts v. United
States Department of Health & Human Services.67 The U.S. Court of
Appeals for the First Circuit held that although DOMA did not
violate the Tenth Amendment, it nonetheless implicated federalist
“concerns,” which warranted a closer look at the governmental68
justifications for the statute:
[The consequences upon states of the] denial of federal benefits
to same-sex couples lawfully married . . . do not violate the
Tenth Amendment . . . but Congress’ effort to put a thumb on
the scales and influence a state’s decision as to how to shape its
own marriage laws does bear on how the justifications are
assessed.
....
Given that DOMA intrudes broadly into an area of traditional
state regulation, a closer examination of the justifications that
would prevent DOMA from violating equal protection (and thus
from exceeding federal authority) is uniquely reinforced by
federalism concerns.69

The First Circuit’s treatment of DOMA’s unusual deviation from
federalist principles not as providing the basis of an

66.

See Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 125 (1992) (“[T]he
Court has always been reluctant to expand the concept of substantive
due process because guideposts for responsible decisionmaking in this
unchartered area are scarce and open-ended.” (citing Regents of Univ. of
Mich. v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214, 225–26 (1985))); see also CHARLES L.
BLACK JR., A NEW BIRTH OF FREEDOM: HUMAN RIGHTS, NAMED AND
UNNAMED 3, 100–01 (1997) (“This paradoxical, even oxymoronic
phrase—‘substantive due process’—has been inflated into a patched and
leaky tire on which precariously rides the load of some substantive
human rights not named in the Constitution[] . . . .[T]his non-concept
rests on insufficient commitment, and has too little firm meaning (if it
has any at all) to beget the kind of confidence, in judges or in others,
that ought to underlie the regime of human rights.”).

67.

682 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 2884, 2887 (2013).

68.

By “governmental” justifications, I mean those set forth by “BLAG,”
the “Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group” that took over the defense of
DOMA after the Department of Justice declined to defend it. See
United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2684 (2013); H.R. Res. 5,
113th Cong., 1st Sess., § 4(a)(1)(B) (2013) (“[BLAG] continues to speak
for, and articulates the institutional position of, the House in all
litigation matters in which it appears, including in Windsor v. United
States.”).

69.

Massachusetts, 682 F.3d at 12–13.
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unconstitutionality holding, but, rather, as triggering more careful
scrutiny of government justifications was what one scholar, Professor
Courtney Joslin, dubbed “the unusualness trigger theory,”70 one of
many possible approaches to federalism.
The First Circuit’s approach to federalism in Massachusetts was,
critically, quite different from that taken by the lower court in that
case. The lower court had deemed DOMA to be a categorical
violation of the Tenth Amendment and state sovereignty because “the
authority to regulate marital status is a sovereign attribute of
statehood.”71 As Professor David Cruz argued in an article published
after the district court’s decision but prior to the subsequent First
Circuit decision, the “categorical federalism approach” reflected by
the district court’s opinion is problematic, because “[c]urrent
doctrine . . . does not recognize the Tenth Amendment as a font of
categorical free-floating subject matter limitations on federal power.”72
However, Cruz offered that uncategorical arguments should still be
made for DOMA’s unconstitutionality on federalist grounds,
highlighting, for example, how DOMA uniquely operates “in the core”
of domestic relations by redefining marriage “across the board in
virtually any area in which the federal government acts,” and in the
process singling out same-sex married couples for de-classification as
married, despite their state’s laws respecting their marriages, thereby
“violat[ing] constitutional federalism principles, even if not for the
categorical reason seemingly relied on by the District Court in
Massachusetts v. United States Department of Health and Human
Services.”73
In yet another approach to using federalism to pursue marriage
equality, Tribe and Matz explain that a properly argued federalismbased challenge could be made to DOMA without undermining a
future federal challenge to a state marriage ban because “[t]he Court’s
doctrinal expression of federalism favors freedom from federal
government intrusion rather than a right to federal government
protection.”74 In other words, federalism is a sword against the federal
legislative branch exceeding its authority but is not a shield states
may use to ward off federal judicial review. As Tribe and Matz
explain:
70.

Courtney G. Joslin, Windsor, Federalism, and Family Equality, 113
COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 156, 163 (2013). http://www.columbialawrev
iew.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/Joslin-113-Colum.-L.-Rev.Sidebar-156.pdf.

71.

Massachusetts v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 698
F. Supp. 2d 234, 251 (D. Mass. 2010).

72.

Cruz, supra note 65, at 819.

73.

Id. at 827.

74.

Tribe & Matz, supra note 62, at 209–10.
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For marriage equality, federalism-based principles of respect for
traditional state autonomy and sub-national political process
provide a sword against regressive federal laws (such as DOMA)
without affording a shield to regressive state laws (such as
same-sex marriage bans).
We are thus dealing with a rather particular federalism: one
that does not respect states’ choices about whether to expand
liberty, but only state choices that actually do so; that limits
federal legislative power when it intrudes upon comparatively
liberty-enhancing state policy, but does not limit federal judicial
power that intrudes upon comparatively regressive state policy.
At least in this context, federalism is a one-way ratchet toward
liberty (or at least a certain kind of liberty). A civil rights
advocate is tempted to think, Vive la Fédéralisme!75

With these various views on federalism’s meaning and appropriate
role in judicial challenges to DOMA percolating across the country in
the years leading up to Windsor, the sword-shield approach is
consistent with the Massachusetts court’s explanation of the limited
role of federalism as applied to DOMA. In that case, the First Circuit
explained:
Supreme Court interpretations of the Tenth Amendment have
varied over the years but those in force today have struck down
statutes only where Congress sought to commandeer state
governments or otherwise directly dictate the internal
operations of state government. Whatever its spin-off effects,
section 3 governs only federal programs and funding, and does
not share these two vices of commandeering or direct
command.76

While there were competing views by same-sex marriage
advocates and scholars on precisely what a federalist argument in a
DOMA challenge should look like, federalism remained a pervasive
theme in dialogues on the constitutionality of DOMA in the years
leading up to Windsor. When DOMA finally arrived at the Supreme
Court through the Windsor case, two sets of amici, unsurprisingly,
presented federalist arguments to the Court in favor of striking down
DOMA, although the two amici briefs took different approaches to
arguing federalism. As Professor Joslin describes, the amici

75.

Id. at 210.

76.

Massachusetts v. U.S. Dept. Health & Human Servs., 682 F.3d 1, 12
(1st Cir. 2012) (citations omitted), cert denied, 133 S. Ct. 2884, 2887
(2013).
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“Federalism Scholars” made a categorical argument that the power to
define marital status lies solely with the states.77
In contrast, “[a] qualitatively different federalism-based argument
was pressed by other parties and amici,”78 namely that Section 3 of
DOMA should be subject to careful scrutiny under equal protection
review because, in addition to other things, it “‘intrudes on the
States’ traditional authority to regulate marriage and family
relations.’”79
In Perry, the companion case to Windsor, a separate amicus brief
urged the Court more generally toward incremental judicial
restraint.80 Tribe and Matz describe that brief, which warned against
granting certiorari in the Proposition 8 case, as an “amicus brief
buil[t] on a wave of scholarship that blends history and political
science into grand narratives that preach the comparative merits of
legal gradualism, especially when pegged to shifting public opinion
and a Court keen to conserve its nebulous institutional capital.”81
Tribe and Matz grant that there is “much to commend” about the
type of minimalism advocated by the amicus brief, once one considers
77.

Joslin, supra note 70, at 161 (citing Brief of Federalism Scholars as
Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent Windsor at 3–4, United States
v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013) (No. 12-307)).

78.

Id. at 162.

79.

Id. (quoting Brief on the Merits for the States of New York et al. as
Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent Edith Schlain Windsor at 3,
Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (No. 12-307)).

80.

See Brief of Amici Curiae William N. Eskridge Jr., Bruce A. Ackerman,
Daniel A. Farber & Andrew Koppelman in Support of Respondents at
15–20, Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013) (No. 12-144);
Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (No. 12-307). One of the brief’s authors,
Andrew Koppelman, was a member of Case Western Reserve University
School of Law’s same-sex marriage symposium for which this Article is
submitted; I was honored to share a panel with him on the doctrinal
meaning of Windsor. See generally Andrew Koppelman, Beyond Levels
of Scrutiny: Windsor and “Bare Desire to Harm,” 64 Case. W. Res. L.
Rev. 1045 (2014).

81.

Tribe & Matz, supra note 62, at 202–03. The article by Tribe and Matz,
presenting a snapshot of the months following the filing of the amicus
briefs in Perry and Windsor but prior to Court’s decisions in those
cases, describes more broadly what they then perceived as “the shifting
role of minimalism,” and its interplay with gay rights advocates’ “fickle
romance with federalism” in the pursuit of liberty and equal protections
in that historic moment in time. Id. at 200. Recounting the
pervasiveness of the push toward minimalism in LGBT rights litigation
in these “fragile times [when the Court is] delicately poised on Justice
Anthony Kennedy’s evolving vision of liberty,” id. at 199, Tribe and
Matz note the frequent tendency of federal courts in same-sex marriage
cases “moved by a powerful spirit of minimalism to concentrate their
firepower on smaller targets” and thereby prevent backlash. Id. at 201.
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the uncertainty of a Supreme Court victory for marriage equality and
the risk of backlash.82 While agreeing it would not be expedient to
disregard the tactical considerations represented by minimalism, they
nonetheless describe minimalism as “a gamble on an uncertain
future—a bet that the Court will not tilt irretrievably conservative,
that state-level constitutional bans on same-sex marriage can be
overcome through political process, and that we are learning (but not
overlearning) the right lessons from our complicated past.”83 Thus,
they conclude, “[a] measure of modesty in addressing these
questions—whether we should be minimalist in litigation and in the
goals of adjudication and, if so, how—will remain critical as LGBT
rights advocates move forward.”84
In the end, it is the cautious approach to federalism that seems
the sagest, although it is admittedly easy to say that from the relative
luxury of an after-the-fact retrospective when it is now evident that a
majority of the Windsor Court would be receptive to individual
rights-based attacks on DOMA, rather than a Tenth Amendment
federalist claim.
Most importantly, some rights are, quite simply, too fundamental
to be left to majority will. As explained by a federal court in Utah,
upon applying Windsor to strike down that state’s same-sex
constitutional marriage ban, “[t]he Constitution guarantees that all
citizens have certain fundamental rights. These rights vest in every
person over whom the Constitution has authority and, because they
are so important, an individual’s fundamental rights ‘may not be
submitted to vote; they depend on the outcome of no elections.’”85
Thus, especially “[g]iven the importance of marriage as a fundamental
right and its relation to an individual’s rights to liberty, privacy, and
association, the Supreme Court has not hesitated to invalidate state
laws pertaining to marriage whenever such a law intrudes on an
individual’s protected realm of liberty.”86 Leaving fundamental rights
to the vote of a simple democratic majority can too easily result in
the type of majority tyranny our Constitution was written to prevent;

82.

Id. at 203.

83.

Id.

84.

Id.

85.

Kitchen v. Herbert, No. 2:13-cv-217, 2013 WL 6697874, at *9 (D. Utah
Dec. 20, 2013) (quoting W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S.
624, 638 (1943)). Kitchen v. Herbert is one of two federal decisions,
along with a similar Oklahoma decision, Bishop v. United States ex rel.
Holder, No. 04-CV-848-TCK-TLW, 2014 WL 116013 (N.D. Okla. Jan.
14, 2014), which struck down such a state constitutional provision in the
six months following Windsor.

86.

Kitchen, 2013 WL 6697874, at *11.
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it is anathema to our constitutional democracy for free-flowing
prejudices to be left unchecked by federal constitutional safeguards.87
The vestiges of the same type of prejudice that caused racial
segregation, prompting federal judicial intervention in Brown v. Board
of Education,88 were also present in state interracial marriage bans,
prompting federal judicial intervention in Loving v. Virginia.89
However, had those issues been left to majority will, state-by-state,
there would likely remain states that prohibit people from marrying
the loves of their life if one’s beloved is of a different race, just as,
today (as of the writing of this Article), many states continue to
prohibit people from marrying the loves of their life if one’s beloved is
of the same sex.
As the federal district court in the Utah case recognized,
individual and state rights “are both weighty concerns.”90 The Kitchen
court further explained, however, that where they are in direct
opposition to each other, Supreme Court cases such as Loving have in
analogous circumstances resolved that tension by establishing “that
the Fourteenth Amendment requires that individual rights take
precedence over states’ rights where these two interests are in
conflict” and “holding that a state’s power to regulate marriage is
limited by the Fourteenth Amendment.”91 After all, in the end,
federal constitutional rights are, under the Supremacy Clause of
Article VI the U.S. Constitution, supreme over state laws that
threaten to deny those rights.
C.

The Doctrinal Bases for the Plaintiffs’ Argument
and the Court’s Holding in Windsor

While federalist arguments remained too tempting for some amici
in Windsor to resist, the plaintiffs, in contrast, did not ultimately
base their case on a state powers federalist argument. Rather, their
87.

See Barbara J. Cox, “The Tyranny of the Majority Is No Myth”: Its
Dangers for Same-Sex Couples, 34 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL’Y 235,
244–50 (2013) (discussing the threat of majority tyranny generally, and
to same-sex couples specifically, through an examination of ALEXIS DE
TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA (1835), THE FEDERALIST No. 10
(James Madison); Windsor v. United States, 699 F.3d 169 (2d Cir.
2012); United States v. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4
(1938)).

88.

347 U.S. 483 (1954).

89.

388 U.S. 1 (1967). Loving, it is worth emphasizing, was not a federalist
decision and was also enforced with none of the problems faced by
schools trying to desegregate after Brown; nor should a parallel decision
striking down same-sex marriage bans have any more enforcement
problems than occurred after Loving.

90.

Kitchen, 2013 WL 6697874, at *7.

91.

Id.
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argument emphasized individual constitutional rights: the denial of
equal protection of fundamental liberties resulting from DOMA’s
destructive force on the rights of same-sex married couples.92
Perhaps this was in part due to the fact that, by then, the civil
rights litigation movement’s enthusiastic (and misguided) love affair
with The Hollow Hope and minimalism had died down just
enough for the plaintiffs in Windsor to rely on strong, impassioned,
and principled individual rights arguments. Or perhaps the plaintiffs
were never that tempted to emphasize Tenth Amendment arguments
in lieu of equal protection and liberty arguments in the first place.
They may have been sufficiently confident (and rightly so) that the
rights at issue were the same privacy and liberty rights that were
recognized in the last two LGBT-rights cases, and in a long line of
individual autonomy cases before then,93 even though minimalists
might decry such equal liberty building blocks as too abstract and
amorphous to form a proper basis for a Supreme Court decision.
For whichever reason, rather than claim that DOMA violated the
Tenth Amendment, the argument made by Edie Windsor was “that
DOMA violates the guarantee of equal protection, as applied to the
Federal Government through the Fifth Amendment.”94 The Court’s
holding, in turn, reflected the plaintiffs’ articulation of the issues,
while also spelling out the liberty component of the equal protection
violation. Specifically, the Court held on the merits that DOMA
“violates basic due process and equal protection principles applicable
to the federal government. . . . By seeking to displace [the State’s
protection for same-sex married couples] and treating those persons as
living in marriages less respected than others, the federal statute is in
violation of the Fifth Amendment.”95
By basing its finding of unconstitutionality on Fifth Amendment
due process and equal protection grounds rather than Tenth
Amendment federalism grounds, the Windsor Court “dodged a
bullet,” and “[w]hile its acceptance would have brought along the
short-term gain of providing a basis for invalidating DOMA, it also
would have curtailed the ability of federal officials to protect same-sex
couples and other families”96 in future cases. On some level, the Court
may have been tempted by federalism and flirted with it long enough
in the majority opinion to confuse some into viewing the decision as a
92.

See generally Brief on the Merits for Respondent Edith Schlain Windsor,
United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013) (No. 12-307).

93.

See generally Marcus, supra note 13 (examining the history of privacy
rights in Supreme Court jurisprudence).

94.

United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2683 (2013).

95.

Id. at 2693, 2696.

96.

Joslin, supra note 70, at 158.
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federalist decision. However, such an interpretation of Windsor would
be a misreading, for the reasons set forth in the following Part. In the
end, Justice Kennedy was not swayed in Windsor from the equal
liberty foundation he had carefully laid in the preceding LGBT rights
cases for the marriage equality case that finally arrived in the form of
Windsor, and will likely reemerge in the near future.

II. Why Windsor Is Not a Federalist Decision
When the Windsor decision was released, perhaps having been
conditioned to anticipate a federalist decision on DOMA, a number of
scholars,97 practitioners,98 journalists,99 and a couple of lower courts100
97.

See, e.g., id. at 158 n.15 (“‘Much of the DOMA decision’s reasoning is
based on federalism considerations.’”) (citation omitted); Katie Eyer,
Lower Court Popular Constitutionalism, 123 Yale L.J. Online 197,
214 (2013), http://yalelawjournal.org/2013/9/15/eyer.html (“Drawing
widely on seemingly sui generis federalism and liberty-based reasoning,
the Court offered virtually no guidance on how its reasoning might be
applied to future cases, either in the equal protection context or
elsewhere.”); see also Rick Hills, Windsor and the States’ Power to
Define Federal Constitutional Rights: Does Kennedy Revive Justice
Harlan’s Theory of Rights?, PRAWFSBLAWG (June 26, 2013, 11:51 AM)
http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2013/06/windsor-and-thestates-power-to-define-federal-constitutionalrights.html (“For federalism
fans, the most interesting aspect of Windsor is its recognition that state
law can define, at least in part, the scope of federal constitutional rights
by (for instance) defining what constitutes an arbitrary classification
under the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process clause.”); Damon Root,
Federalism and Liberty in the Supreme Court’s Gay Marriage Cases,
REASON.COM: HIT & RUN BLOG (June 26, 2013, 12:17 PM),
http://reason.com/blog/2013/06/26/federalism-and-liberty-in-thesupreme-co (“In his majority opinion today invaliding Section 3 of the
1996 Defense of Marriage Act, Justice Anthony Kennedy employed two
of the most common themes in his jurisprudence: federalism and
liberty.”).

98.

Scott Lauck et al., Future of Marriage in Missouri No Clearer After
Supreme Court Ruling, MO. LAWYERS MEDIA, June 28, 2013, available
at 2013 WLNR 16319428.

99.

See, e.g., Jerry Elmer, United States v. Windsor: Another Victory for
Gay Rights, R.I.B.J., Sept.–Oct. 2013, at 13, 16 (“[T]he closest the
majority decision comes to stating a doctrinal basis for its ruling is
federalism.”); James Oliphant, Supreme Court Rulings on Gay
Marriage: A Liberal Result Wrapped in Conservative Values, NAT’L J.,
(June 26, 2013), http://www.nationaljournal.com/domesticpolicy/supre
me-court-rulings-on-gay-marriage-a-liberal-result-wrapped-inconservative-values-20130626; Editorial, From the High Court, a Victory
for Federalism, KEY W. CITIZEN, July 1, 2013, at 4a.

100. See Robicheaux v. Caldwell, CIV.A. 13-5090, 2014 WL 4347099 (E.D.
La. Sept. 3, 2014) (“Windsor leaves unchanged ‘the concerns for state
diversity and sovereignty.’”); Com. Dep’t of Health v. Hanes, No. 379
M.D. 2013, 2013 WL 5469566 at *1 (Pa. Commw. Ct. Sept. 12, 2013)
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identified Windsor as a federalist decision. The vast majority of
federal courts—other than the lone above-cited Louisiana district
court judge—applying Windsor to same-sex marriage equality claims
since the decision, however, have rejected such a federalist
interpretation.101
Interestingly, Windsor’s dissenting justices themselves were
divided on whether Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion from which
they were dissenting was based on federalism. On the one hand, Chief
Justice Roberts’s dissent, for example, describes the majority opinion
as “undeniabl[y] . . . based on federalism.”102 Similarly, while not
labeling the majority opinion a federalist opinion, Justice Alito’s
dissent “wholeheartedly” agrees “[t]o the extent that the Court takes
the position that the question of same-sex marriage should be resolved
primarily at the state level.”103 On the other hand, Justice Scalia
seemed to think that Chief Justice Roberts was fooled by the majority
into thinking of its opinion as a federalist decision, writing, “the
opinion starts with seven full pages about the traditional power of
States to define domestic relations—initially fooling many readers, I
am sure, into thinking that this is a federalism opinion.”104 Elsewhere
in his dissent, Scalia suggests that the majority opinion is part equal
protection, part due process, and part “amorphous federalism.”105
However, as Justice Scalia himself recognizes in the first
comment, Windsor is not at its core a federalist decision. As the vast
majority of federal courts applying Windsor have recognized, and for
(ordering rogue clerk to stop issuing marriage license to same-sex couple
and describing Windsor in the following terms: “Because the regulation
of marriage is a matter for the states, the Supreme Court found that a
federal definition of marriage that creates ‘two contradictory marriage
regimes within the same State’ must fall. Congress ‘interfered’ with
‘state sovereign choices’ about who may be married by creating its own
definition, relegating one set of marriages—same-sex marriages—to the
‘second-tier,’ making them ‘unequal.’” (citing United States v. Windsor,
133 S. Ct. 2675, 2694 (2013)).
101. See supra section II.B., discussing Bostic v. Schaefer, Nos. 14–1167, 14–
1169, 14–1173, 2014 WL 3702493 (4th Cir. July 28, 2014); Kitchen v.
Herbert, 755 F.3d 1193, 1207 (10th Cir. 2014); Latta v. Otter, 1:13-CV00482-CWD, 2014 WL 1909999 (D. Idaho May 13, 2014); Bishop v.
United States ex rel. Holder, No. 04-CV-848-TCK-TLW, 2014 WL
116013 (N.D. Okla. Jan. 14, 2014); Wolf v. Walker, 986 F. Supp. 2d
982, 997 (W.D. Wis. 2014); Bostic v. Rainey, 970 F. Supp. 2d 456, 476
(E.D. Va. 2014).
102. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2697 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
103. Id. at 2720 (Alito, J., dissenting).
104. Id. at 2705 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
105. Id. at 2707. For a thorough discussion of “amorphous federalism,” see
David B. Cruz, “Amorphous Federalism” and the Supreme Court’s
Marriage Cases, 59 Loyola L. Rev. ___ (2014) (forthcoming).
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the reasons set forth below as well, Windsor reasonably cannot be
read as a federalist decision affirming an exclusive state power to
regulate marriage unchecked by federal judicial review.
A.

About Those “Seven Full Pages . . .”

Justice Scalia offers the following as a reason that some might
interpret Windsor’s majority opinion as a federalism opinion: “the
opinion starts with seven full pages about the traditional power of
States to define domestic relations—initially fooling many readers, I
am sure, into thinking that this is a federalism opinion.”106 However,
this statement by Scalia is somewhat misleading.
Seven pages is not an accurate page count of the majority
opinion’s state powers discussion, which only takes up two pages out
of the fourteen-paged final reported version of the Windsor majority
opinion.107 The seven-page tally cited by Scalia clearly came from the
slip opinion, in which the discussion did total seven pages out of
twenty-six.108 However, as a seasoned Supreme Court Justice, Justice
Scalia should certainly know that the final reported version of the
decision would contain a different, much less lengthy, pagination than
the slip copy circulated among the Justices, and that both Bluebook
rules and his own Court’s instructions on citation require citing to the
reporter, not the slip opinion, particularly where they conflict in some
manner.109 By instead emphasizing the slip opinion’s higher page
number tally in order to emphasize how much ink the majority had
devoted to an issue, despite the certain knowledge that the final
version of the opinion would be much shorter in terms of pagination,
Scalia’s dissent could give the impression that half of the majority’s
opinion (which was fourteen pages in final reported form) was devoted
to federalism, not a mere two out of fourteen pages. As such, Scalia
arguably engages in a bit of trickery in his exaggeration of the
section’s length in order to make a rhetorical point, and his
accusation of foolery by the majority might just be a case of the pot
calling the kettle black.
B.

Windsor’s Loving Reminder of the Primacy of Individual Rights

Another reason that Windsor’s two-page state powers discussion
does not render Windsor a federalist opinion lies in Justice Kennedy’s
pointed citation of Loving v. Virginia, which immediately prefaces the
106. Windsor, at 2705.
107. See id. at 2691–93 (majority opinion).
108. United States v. Windsor, No.12-307, slip op. (U.S. 2013).
109. See THE BLUEBOOK: A UNIFORM SYSTEM OF CITATION R.B4.1.2, at 9
(Columbia Law Review Ass’n et al. eds., 19th ed. 2010); 2013 Term
Opinions of the Court, Sup. Ct. U.S., http://www.supremecourt.gov/
opinions/slipopinions.aspx (last visited Feb. 22, 2014).
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state powers discussion.110 Specifically, the Windsor majority opinion
contains the following cautionary language immediately before
launching into its state powers discussion:
[I]t is necessary to discuss the extent of the state power and
authority over marriage as a matter of history and tradition.
State laws defining and regulating marriage, of course, must
respect the constitutional rights of persons, but, subject to those
guarantees, “regulation of domestic relations” is “an area that
has long been regarded as a virtually exclusive province of the
States.”111

Thus, the Court in Windsor did not describe the issue of marriage
law as so exclusively within the province of state legislation that it
falls outside the scope of federal judicial review even when it affects
individual constitutional rights. To the contrary, the majority
opinion’s reference to Loving frames and limits its ensuing state
powers discussion in a manner that should remind the reader that
while state legislative powers may trump federal legislative powers in
some cases, constitutional rights may still be protected against state
infringement by the federal judiciary. The Court’s powers of judicial
review over unconstitutional state legislation are not limited by
federalism. Rather, judicial review is a limitation upon federalism.
The critical significance of the Windsor Court’s citation to Loving
and its emphasis that state marriage laws may not violate
fundamental individual rights has not been lost on the federal courts
that have applied Windsor to subsequent marriage equality cases.
For example, in the first federal marriage equality decision
following Windsor, the Northern District of Oklahoma in Bishop v.
United States ex rel. Holder112 emphasized Windsor’s repeated use of
“the disclaimer ‘subject to constitutional guarantees’” and described
Windsor’s citation to Loving as “a disclaimer of enormous
proportion.”113 Continuing with an explanation of the Constitution’s
individual rights limits upon federalism, Bishop continued: “Arguably,
the ‘state rights’ portion of the Windsor decision stands for the
unremarkable proposition that a state has broad authority to regulate
marriage, so long as it does not violate its citizens’ federal
constitutional rights.”114 Other federal district courts addressing
110. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2691 (majority opinion) (citing Loving v.
Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967)).
111. Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 404 (1975))

(citing Loving, 388 U.S. at 87).
112. No. 04-CV-848-TCK-TLW, 2014 WL 116013 (N.D. Okla. Jan. 14, 2014).
113. Id. at *18 (emphasis added) (quoting Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2692).
114. Id.
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challenges to same-sex marriage bans have followed suit, similarly
concluding that the Windsor decision was based on individual rights,
not federalist principles.115
Federal appeals courts have likewise rejected efforts to paint
Windsor as a federalist decision that leaves the determination of
same-sex marriage rights up to the states. In Kitchen v. Herbert,116
the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected the appellants’ federalism
argument, explaining,
The Windsor Court concluded it was “unnecessary to decide
whether” DOMA “is a violation of the Constitution because it
disrupts the federal balance.” Rather than relying on federalism
principles, the Court framed the question presented as whether
the “injury and indignity” caused by DOMA “is a deprivation
of an essential part of the liberty protected by the Fifth
Amendment.”117
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals similarly explained in Bostic
v. Schaefer118 that although the Windsor decision was in part based
“on the Supreme Court’s respect for states’ supremacy in the
domestic relations sphere,” the Court in Windsor did not, however,
“lament that section 3 had usurped states’ authority over marriage
due to its desire to safeguard federalism . . . . Its concern sprung from

115. See Wolf v. Walker, 986 F. Supp. 2d at 997 (“[T]he Court declined
expressly to rely on federalism as a basis for its conclusion that DOMA
is unconstitutional.”); Bostic v. Rainey, 970 F. Supp. 2d at 476 (“This
Court remains mindful that the federal intervention is best exercised
rarely, and that the powers regarding domestic relations properly rest
with the good offices of state and local government. This deference is
appropriate, and even essential. However, federal courts have
intervened, properly, when state regulations have infringed upon the
right to marry. The Windsor Court prefaced its analysis about deference
to the state laws defining and regulating marriage by citing Loving’s
holding that recognized that ‘of course,’ such laws ‘must respect the
constitutional rights of persons.’”) (citations omitted); Latta v. Otter,
2014 WL 1909999 at *11 (“‘[F]ederalism’ is no answer where, as here,
individuals claim their state government has trampled their
constitutional rights. Indeed, Windsor also recognizes the transcendent
quality of individual constitutional rights, even when those rights
conflict with a state’s traditional sovereign authority. ‘State laws
defining and regulating marriage, of course, must respect the
constitutional rights of persons, see, e.g., Loving . . . .’ Windsor, 133 S.
Ct. at 2691” (emphasis added)).
116. 755 F.3d 1193 (10th Cir. 2014).
117. Kitchen v. Herbert, 755 F.3d 1193, 1207 (10th Cir. 2014).
118. 760 F.3d 352 (4th Cir. 2014).
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section 3’s creation of two classes of married couples within

states that had legalized same-sex marriage. . . .”119
Therefore, it has been widely recognized that the Windsor
decision is ultimately an affirmation of individual rights, not state
rights. As with Loving, even if an area of legislation, such as marriage
law, is traditionally left to the states rather than dictated by
Congress, state law does not trump federal law for purposes of
exempting state legislation from federal judicial review. The United
States Constitution is still the supreme law of the land, with the
Federal Constitution setting forth limits on both federal and state
power.120 As such, individual federal constitutional rights still reign
supreme in some cases, including in the case of either federal or state
attempts to carve out a class of persons for the deprivation of
fundamental rights, including marriage.121 As previously explained,
federalism can be a sword used by the State against federal legislative
intrusion, but it is not a shield the state may use to exempt itself
from federal constitutional mandates.122
The Court’s citation to Loving in Windsor signals that the state
powers discussion that follows the Loving citation should in no
manner be viewed as granting states unbridled authority to define
marriage in a way that unconstitutionally discriminates against
members of disfavored groups. In a future decision, the Court should
specify the extent to which laws limiting marriage rights by the sex of
one’s intended spouse are analogous to the laws struck down in
Loving that limited marriage rights by the race of one’s intended
spouse. Loving will ultimately be a difficult case for same-sex marriage
opponents to distinguish, as will other cases in which the Court has
affirmed the fundamental right to marry in other contexts, even for
prisoners, who give up many rights upon conviction and
incarceration.123 Regardless of the ultimate outcome of a future
119. Bostic v. Schaefer, 760 F.3d 352, 378 (4th Cir. 2014).
120. U.S. Const. art. VI. “It is emphatically the province and duty of the
judicial department to say what the law is.” Marbury v. Madison, 5
U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
121. See generally Loving, 388 U.S. 1 (holding that “[m]arriage is one of the
‘basis civil rights of man’” and that “[u]nder our Constitution, the
freedom to marry, or not marry, a person of another race resides with
the individual and cannot be infringed by the State”).
122. See supra Part II.B.
123. See generally Marcus, supra note 13, at 418–34 (discussing the
precedential value of Loving for future same-sex marriage cases, as well
as that of Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978), which affirmed a
fundamental right to marry regardless of an individual’s record of
delinquent child support payments and Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78
(1987), which affirmed a fundamental right to marry regardless of
prisoner status).
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challenge to state same-sex marriage bans, Windsor’s citation to
Loving, emphasizing the primacy of fundamental individual marriage
rights over discriminatory state and federal laws, sets the stage for
such a future marriage equality determination, rather than
precluding it.
C.

Federalism Discussed Solely in Context of Evaluating
DOMA’s Stated Justifications

None of this is to say that the two-page state powers discussion
commencing with the Loving citation in Windsor is insubstantial.
Constituting nearly a quarter of the majority opinion’s analysis
section, although not half of the whole opinion as Scalia’s misleading
page count could imply,124 it clearly has some significance. However,
as previously discussed, the Court’s substantial discussion of
federalism principles does not mean that state legislation on marriage
is immune from federal judicial review; the Loving citation is a
pointed reminder of this fundamental principle of constitutional law.
So what does the state powers passage mean?
The Court’s purpose in inserting a state power analysis into an
individual rights decision is revealed when one examines the
surrounding context of the Court’s federalist discussion, namely, the
Court’s scrutiny of the government’s purpose in enacting DOMA.125
By holding DOMA up to the light of longstanding federalism
principles giving federal deference to state marriage laws, the Court
unveiled a profound incongruity between traditional federalist respect
and DOMA’s utter lack of respect for state marriage laws. The Court
concluded that this incongruity was evidence of a constitutionally
suspect purpose. Specifically, the Court found that “DOMA’s unusual
deviation from the usual tradition of recognizing and accepting state
definitions of marriage here operates to deprive same-sex couples of
the benefits and responsibilities that come with the federal recognition
of their marriages.”126 After citing both Romer and a second “rational
basis plus” case in which legislation motivated by animus failed to
pass constitutional muster even under the rational basis test, the
Court then concluded that that deviation, in turn, served as “strong
evidence of a law having the purpose and effect of disapproval of
that class.”127
This analysis by the Court mirrors the First Circuit’s
Massachusetts analysis that employed what Professor Joslin described

124. See supra Part II.B.
125. United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2691–95 (2013).
126. Id. at 2693.
127. Id. (citing Romer v. Evans 517 U.S. 620, 633 (1996); Dept. of
Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534–35 (1973)).
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as the “unusualness trigger theory.”128 It also parallels the Second
Circuit’s conclusion in Windsor that “[b]ecause DOMA is an
unprecedented breach of longstanding deference to federalism that
singles out same-sex marriage as the only inconsistency (among many)
in state law that requires a federal rule to achieve uniformity, the
rationale premised on uniformity is not an exceedingly persuasive
justification.”129
However, whereas the Court of Appeals in Windsor had, in effect,
applied the unusualness trigger theory in direct response to the
Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group’s (BLAG’s)130 argument that
DOMA was justified by the need for a federal rule achieving
uniformity in marriage laws,131 the Supreme Court in Windsor did not
give BLAG’s “uniformity” justification enough credence to even
articulate it explicitly. Rather, the Court conducted an independent
inquiry into what the purpose of DOMA was and made three
interrelated findings about DOMA’s stated purpose, its demonstrated
purpose, and its principal purpose.
First, as to the “stated purpose” of DOMA, the Court quoted the
Congressional Record’s House Report statement “that DOMA
expresses ‘both moral disapproval of homosexuality, and a moral
conviction that heterosexuality better comports with traditional
(especially Judeo–Christian) morality,’” and concluded that “[t]he
stated purpose of the law was to promote an ‘interest in protecting
the traditional moral teachings reflected in heterosexual-only marriage
laws.’ Were there any doubt of this far-reaching purpose, the title of
the Act confirms it: The Defense of Marriage Act.”132 Second, as to
the “demonstrated purpose,” the Court explained that both the
arguments by BLAG and the title and dynamics of the bill revealed
that “[t]he Act’s demonstrated purpose is to ensure that if any State
decides to recognize same-sex marriages, those unions will be treated
as second-class marriages for purposes of federal law. This raises a
most serious question under the Constitution’s Fifth Amendment.”133
Note here the lack of similar reference to the Tenth Amendment.
Third, as to the “principal purpose,” after describing a principal effect
of imposing inequality on a subset of marriages otherwise sanctioned
under state law, the Court concluded that DOMA’s “principal
128. See supra Part I.B.
129. Windsor v. United States, 699 F.3d 169, 186 (2d Cir. 2012), aff’d 133
S. Ct. 2675 (2013).
130. See supra note 68.
131. Windsor, 699 F.3d at 185–86.
132. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2693 (citing H.R. Rep. No. 104-664, at 16
(1996)).
133. Id. at 2693–94.
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purpose is to impose inequality, not for other reasons like
governmental efficiency.”134
While the Supreme Court declined to pay even lip service to the
uniformity justification, the higher Court’s opinion nonetheless
mirrored that of the Second Circuit in a more critical respect: its use
of a vertical separation of powers analysis in support of a separate
horizontal separation of powers conclusion. The Court, in essence,
used principles of traditional federal legislative deference to state
legislative areas including marriage laws (vertical separation of
powers), to illuminate how BLAG’s justifications for DOMA were
constitutionally suspect. That vertical analysis, in turn, established
grounds for increased scrutiny in federal judicial review over a
discriminatory Act of Congress (horizontal separation of powers). By
engaging multiple levels of constitutional law jurisprudence, the Court
concluded that unconstitutional animus may be inferred from the
federal government’s glaringly unprecedented intervention in an area
of law generally left to state determination under federalist
principles.135
It is critical to understand that this conclusion that deviation
from federalist norms evidences animus, triggering a higher degree of
scrutiny, is not the same as a conclusion that DOMA is
unconstitutional because it violates federalist principles. This
distinction is evident in the Court’s explanation that “it is
unnecessary to decide whether this federal intrusion on state power is
a violation of the Constitution because it disrupts the federal balance.
The State’s power in defining the marital relation is of central
relevance in this case quite apart from principles of federalism.”136
Here, the Court unambiguously explains that its discussion of
DOMA’s unusual federal intrusion on state power was relevant not for
the purpose of determining whether DOMA unconstitutionally
violated federalism principles but was relevant for another reason
altogether. It then proceeded to spell out that other reason in terms of
the decision’s primary individual rights analysis:
[T]he State’s decision to give [same-sex couples] the right to
marry conferred upon them a dignity and status of immense
import. When the State used its historic and essential authority
to define the marital relation in this way, its role and its power
in making the decision enhanced the recognition, dignity, and
protection of the class in their own community. DOMA, because
of its reach and extent, departs from this history and tradition
of reliance on state law to define marriage. “[D]iscriminations of
134. Id. at 2694.
135. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2691–92.
136. Id. at 2692 (emphasis added).
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an unusual character especially suggest careful consideration to
determine whether they are obnoxious to the constitutional
provision.”137

In other words, the Court’s analysis of state powers in the context
of marriage laws was relevant for purposes of identifying a deviation
from usual federalist deference, which, in turn evidences
“discrimination[] of an unusual character” warranting close scrutiny.138
However, the deviation from federalist principles does not amount to
a Tenth Amendment violation in and of itself establishing
unconstitutionality.139 Rather, the Fifth Amendment’s due process and
equal protection guarantees are what formed the basis of Windsor’s
ultimate individual rights holding, as described below.140
D.

Textualist Reading of Unambiguous Holding Reveals
an Individual Rights Fifth Amendment Holding,
Not a Federalist Tenth Amendment Holding

The text of Windsor’s holding itself unambiguously cites the
Fifth, not the Tenth, Amendment, yet another clear indicator that
the decision is at its core an individual rights decision, not a
federalism decision.
The majority opinion presents its ultimate holding both at the
beginning of its analysis and at the end. The Court’s first articulation
of the holding is that DOMA “violates basic due process and equal
protection principles applicable to the federal government.”141 The
holding is then repeated at the end of the opinion as follows: “By
seeking to displace [the State’s protection for same-sex married
couples] and treating those persons as living in marriages less
respected than others, the federal statute is in violation of the Fifth
Amendment.”142
Thus, the text of the Court’s holding unambiguously references
the Fifth Amendment, not the Tenth, and clearly indicates that the
137. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Romer, v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 633
(1996)).
138. Id. (emphasis added); cf. Joslin, supra note 70, at 163 (discussing
“unusualness trigger theory”).
139. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2692.
140. As Professor Cruz points out, the only question presented in the
Government’s certiorari petitions was the question of whether Section 3
of DOMA violates equal protection, not whether it violates the
Constitution’s federalism provisions, and the “Supreme Court is only
supposed to decide that question or subsidiary questions ‘fairly included
therein.’” See Cruz, supra note 105, at 30.
141. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2693.
142. Id. at 2696.

1106

Case Western Reserve Law Review· Volume 64· Issue 3·2014
When Quacking Like a Duck Is Really a Swan Song in Disguise

Court’s decision is one based on a finding of due process and equal
protection, i.e., individual rights, violations. State powers and
federalism are not even mentioned in the Court’s articulations of
its holding.
E.

Court Details Examples of Federal Legislation in Area of Marriage

One final indicia of Windsor’s not being a federalist opinion is the
Court’s explicit affirmation of Congress’ authority to enact statutes
bearing on marriage rights and privileges.143 As examples, Windsor
cites federal preemption of state laws through a federal program
giving a former spouse priority in retaining life insurance proceeds
under formal beneficiary designation rules;144 immigration laws
pertaining to the treatment of noncitizen marriages regardless of
relevant state law;145 and the federal statutes setting forth the incomebased Social Security benefit criteria, reflecting Congress’ decision
“that although state law would determine in general who qualifies as
an applicant’s spouse, common-law marriages also should be
recognized, regardless of any particular State’s view on these
relationships.”146 These examples from the Court reinforce the
limitations of federalism, under which, the Court explains, even
legislative actions by the federal government may in some cases
substantially affect and even regulate legal areas generally left to state
legislatures.
For all of the above reasons, Justice Scalia may claim that
Windsor deceptively quacks like a federalist duck, and Chief Justice
Roberts may claim the decision is a federalist duck, but the decision
is in fact not a federalist duck at all but is something else entirely.

III. Why, Despite Quacking Like a Duck,
Windsor Is Actually a Swan Song for
Federalist-Based Marriage Discrimination
In the end, while Windsor may emit slight federalist duck quacks,
I propose that Windsor is actually a swan song for federalism-based
marriage discrimination. I have elsewhere written of the inevitability
of a Supreme Court decision recognizing that the deep-rooted
fundamental right to marry the person of one’s choice applies equally
to members of same-sex couples across the country.147 Its inevitability
143. Id. at 2690.
144. Id. (citing Hillman v. Maretta, 133 S. Ct. 1943 (2013); Ridgway v.
Ridgway, 454 U.S. 46 (1981); Wissner v. Wissner, 338 U.S. 655 (1950)).
145. Id. (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1186a(b)(1) (2012)).
146. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(d)(2) (2006)).
147. See generally Nancy C. Marcus, Deeply Rooted Principles of Equal
Liberty, Not “Argle Bargle”: The Inevitability of Marriage Equality
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results from the precedential doctrinal grounds set by past Supreme
Court cases, from Romer and Lawrence to other personal autonomy
cases, ultimately enabling the Court to “strik[e] down same-sex
marriage bans as universally as Loving [v. Virginia] struck down
interracial marriage bans, with the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal
Protection and Substantive Due Process Clauses united to provide
equal liberty guarantees for same-sex couples and their families.”148
In Windsor, building upon the precedent of Romer—which struck
down a broad state constitutional amendment singling out LGBT
individuals for the denial of civil rights protections—the Court
concluded that DOMA analogously “writes inequality into the entire
United States Code.”149 The Windsor Court emphatically reiterated
Romer’s admonition that “[t]he Constitution’s guarantee of equality
‘must at the very least mean that a bare congressional desire to harm
a politically unpopular group cannot’ justify disparate treatment of
that group.”150
Following the precedent of Lawrence, the Windsor Court
explained that DOMA unconstitutionally undermined the state of
New York’s attempt to accord equal liberty protections to same-sex
unions, “for it tells those couples, and all the world, that their
otherwise valid marriages are unworthy of federal recognition. This
places same-sex couples in an unstable position of being in a secondtier marriage. The differentiation demeans the couple, whose moral
and sexual choices the Constitution protects.”151
Finally, in citing Loving, as previously discussed, the Windsor
Court issued a powerful reminder of the limits of federalism when
states abuse their power to discriminate against individuals,
particularly in the context of fundamental marriage rights152—not that
the precedential grounds for Windsor and future marriage equality
cases started with Loving; to the contrary, the foundation for
autonomy and equal liberty in the recognition of intimate
partnerships has roots as far back as nineteenth-century case law.153

After Windsor, 23 Tul. J. L. & Sexuality 17 (2014); Nancy C.
Marcus, Beyond Romer, supra note 13, at 416–20.
148. Marcus, Argle Bargle, supra note 147.
149. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2694.
150. Id. at 2693 (quoting U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534
(1973)); Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 634 (1996).
151. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2694 (citing Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558
(2003)).
152. See supra Part II.B.
153. See Marcus, supra note 13, at 371–78 (citing Samuel D. Warren & Louis
D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890)); see
also Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578 (1897); Union Pac. Ry. Co. v.

1108

Case Western Reserve Law Review· Volume 64· Issue 3·2014
When Quacking Like a Duck Is Really a Swan Song in Disguise

Furthermore, the constitutional history of judicial review is replete
with examples of the United States Constitution serving as the
ultimate buffer against the abuse of state power in the exercise of
discriminatory treatment and classifications of individuals, whether in
the name of federalism or otherwise. Nor is Windsor’s reverse
incorporation of Fourteenth Amendment equal protection guarantees
into the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause unprecedented.
Although the Fifth Amendment’s text may not contain an explicit
equal protection clause, the “Court’s approach to Fifth Amendment
equal protection claims has always been precisely the same as to equal
protection claims under the Fourteenth Amendment.”154 This is
because, the Court has recognized, “the Constitution imposes upon
federal, state, and local governmental actors the same obligation to
respect the personal right to equal protection of the laws.”155 Windsor
merely builds upon these precedents to affirm that principle in a
context and manner establishing protections of LGBT individuals and
same-sex couples specifically from discriminatory abuses of federal and
state power alike.
As to the transformation of ducks into a swan song for federalismbased marriage discrimination, Windsor’s federalist-seeming analysis
actually sets the stage for the demise of federalist-justified state
denials of equal marriage rights to same-sex couples. The Court in
Windsor held that “DOMA seeks to injure the very class New York [a
state recognizing same-sex marriages] seeks to protect. By doing so it
violates basic due process and equal protection principles applicable to
the Federal Government.”156 That this holding should apply equally to
state governments engaging in the same sort of discrimination is made
evident by the Court’s abundant references throughout the Fifth
Amendment opinion to Fourteenth Amendment cases such as Loving,
Romer, and Lawrence. Its incorporation of these Fourteenth
Amendment cases into its analysis illustrates that the same doctrines
apply under either Amendment.
Windsor serves as the latest and most explicit reminder,
consistent with this longstanding principle, that although state powers
may come before federal powers in some contexts, the Ninth
Amendment (rights reserved to the people) still comes before the
Tenth (powers reserved to the states). In this respect, Windsor
ultimately stands for the limitation on both federal and state
legislative power to engage in class-based, unequal deprivation of

Botsford, 141 U.S. 250 (1891); Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616
(1886)).
154. Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 638 n.2 (1975).
155. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 231–32 (1995).
156. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2693.
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substantive due process rights, including the right of same-sex
married couples to receive equal respect for their marriages.
If Windsor’s recitation of federalist principles were, as Justice
Scalia cynically charged, an attempt to fool the reader,157 this would
be a case of strategic artifice by the Court, resulting in an opinion in
which things are quite the opposite of what they seem. Windsor could
be viewed as a case in which, in the name of limiting federal power,
the Court reaffirmed the broadest power of all—that of
judicial review.
We have seen such strategic rhetorical maneuvering before. Recall
the original Supreme Court case affirming the power of federal judicial
review over the constitutionality of legislation: the parallel between
Windsor and Marbury v. Madison158 is quite striking, when one steps
back to examine Windsor in this light. In Marbury, Justice Marshall,
the Supreme Court’s fourth Chief Justice, engaged in a substantial
discussion of the extent and limitations of federal judicial power, for
the purpose of explaining why the Court lacked original jurisdiction to
issue writs of mandamus under Article III.159 However, on a deeper
and more important level, this explanation of the limits of the Court’s
power turned into an affirmation of the greatest of federal judicial
powers—that of judicial review, with Marshall declaring the Judiciary
Act of 1789 unconstitutional.160 Until Marbury v. Madison, which was
thus written in terms of limiting judicial power even while effectively
serving to broaden that power, there had not been a similar explicit
declaration by the Court that “[i]t is emphatically the province and
duty of the [J]udicial [D]epartment to say what the law is,”161 and
that the power of judicial review accordingly provides the authority of
the Supreme Court to strike a statute in conflict with the Supreme
Law of the Land, i.e., the Constitution.
Is Justice Marshall to be condemned for what, in the eyes of a
cynic, might be viewed as a power grab through rhetorical artifice in
Marbury v. Madison? By engaging in a historically revolutionary
power grab in the name of limiting the Court’s power, was he guilty
of the very type of duplicitousness with which he charged critics of
judicial review, writing in Marbury that such critics “would be giving
to the legislature a practical and real omnipotence, with the same
breath which professes to restrict their powers within narrow
limits”?162
157. Id. at 2705 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
158. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
159. Id. at 168–80.
160. Id. at 180.
161. Id. at 177.
162. Id. at 178.
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Or was he merely striking a balance between articulating the
Supreme Court’s constitutional restraints, while also recognizing the
power of judicial review that was already inherent in the early
structure of our constitutional democracy and its judicial structures?
Is Justice Kennedy, over two centuries later, fairly subject to
parallel criticism? Has he tried to pull a fast one, first in Lawrence, as
Justice Scalia charged in his dissent in that opinion,163 and again in
Windsor, attempting to mask his more ambitious intent in both cases
of enabling a future sweeping same-sex marriage decision that will
secure him a heroic spot in history?164
Both questions may be answered the same way. Perhaps, in each
case, the ends justify the means. In the case of Marbury, it was
necessary to pay lip service to judicial humility to soften the force of
the most powerful assumption of judicial power in the Court’s
history—the power of judicial review that is now generally accepted
as necessary and important for the protection of federal constitutional
rights and delineation of constitutional checks and balances of
governmental powers. Similarly, Justice Kennedy’s LGBT rights
opinions may be viewed as having created a carefully constructed
stage for the final act of marriage equality jurisprudence, each adding
an additional foundation for more bold opinions down the road, secure
in the precedents set by Romer, Lawrence, and Windsor. And while
clever, and at times indirect, these doctrinal foundations are not a
matter of play but are the serious and studied work of a Supreme
163. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 604 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“At the
end of its opinion—after having laid waste the foundations of our
rational-basis jurisprudence—the Court says that the present case ‘does
not involve whether the government must give formal recognition to any
relationship that homosexual persons seek to enter.’ Do not believe it.”
(quoting Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578 (majority opinion)).
164. Running with this cynical view for a moment, a tangential literary
comparison begs to be made to Kennedy’s and Marshall’s possible
parallel strategies of rhetorical artifice. Such a political power grab
disguised as the opposite, committed through clever, rhetorical
wordsmithing, also is displayed in at least one other political context:
the Shakespearean telling of the aftermath of Julius Caesar’s
assassination, in the form of Marc Antony’s famous “Friends, Romans,
Countrymen, I come to bury Caesar, not to praise him” speech.
William Shakespeare, JULIUS CAESAR, act 3, sc. 2. In that speech,
again in the name of humility and honoring the limits of power, Antony
effects the seizure of power from Brutus even while paying him lip
service as “an honorable man,” in order to avenge the slain Julius
Caesar, from whom he distanced himself rhetorically even as, between
the lines, he avenged his murder and reclaimed power from his slayers.
Id. Just like the aforementioned opinions by Justices Marshall and
Kennedy, the speech by Shakespeare’s Marc Antony could be viewed as
engaging in a strategically savvy claim to power through manipulative
rhetoric that accomplishes the opposite of what, on the surface, it seems
to say at first glance.
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Court Justice writing what he truly believes, in furtherance of what
he just as sincerely believes to be his duty to the Constitution and
the country.

IV. Beyond Minimalism: Foundation-Building
Jurisprudence as a Giant Leap, Not Small Step,
Toward Significant Evolutions in Rights Protections
In some respects, Windsor presents the most solid foundation to
date of any Supreme Court case addressing LGBT issues, as it sets
forth substantial limitations upon government abuses of power, for
the ultimate and primary purposes of protecting fundamental
individual liberty interests. Further, by acknowledging both liberty
and equality components of same-sex marriage protections, under the
Fifth as well as the Fourteen Amendment, Windsor, as an equal
liberty decision, bridges doctrines and unifies principles and
precedents into an increasingly clearer equal liberty doctrine for the
twenty-first century.
Even among LGBT rights and marriage equality allies, there are
those stragglers from the minimalist camp who may shudder at such
lofty principle-based doctrinal evolutions as a basis for a line of cases
involving politically heated issues. The unapologetic development of
a more coherent twenty-first century equal liberty doctrine through a
foundation-building jurisprudence is more akin to a giant leap than
a small step toward significant constitutional rights protections.
But why, if not engaging in artifice, do Justice Kennedy’s LGBTrights opinions fail to own up to the tremendous precedential import
each of them has in paving the path toward future cases protecting
equal liberties of LGBT individuals? Why was the Court so careful to
disclaim in the Lawrence opinion that that case “[did] not involve
whether the government must give formal recognition to any
relationship that homosexual persons seek to enter,”165 and in Windsor
that “[t]his opinion and its holding are confined to those lawful
marriages [performed in states recognizing same-sex marriage],”166
both times prompting Justice Scalia to roll his eyes in response with
accusations of foul play and trickery?167 As Scalia predicted, Lawrence
did indeed become a building block for a future opinion affirming
same-sex marriage rights.168 Underscoring the connection between the
two cases is the fact that Windsor was decided not just on the last

165. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578 (majority opinion).
166. United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2696 (2013).
167. Id. at 2705 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 604 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
168. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 604.
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day of the Court’s term in 2013, but ten years to the very date that
Lawrence had been decided.
There are several possible explanations for Justice Kennedy’s
serving up cautionary narrowing language and failing to explicitly
flesh out the extent of the rights affirmed in his opinions that are
otherwise breathtaking in their strong articulation of constitutional
principles and protections of LGBT individuals.169 First, there is a
perceived jurisprudential preference among jurists to decide cases on
narrow grounds.170 Perhaps influenced by this, Justice Kennedy, even
while issuing doctrinally powerful decisions in LGBT rights cases,
nonetheless has been tempered by this culture of encouraging a
narrow framing of decisions, if only to garner the most votes among
one’s colleagues on the bench. Second, Justice Kennedy may be acting
out of a sense of political fairness, expedience, or even ambivalence,
well aware that he is the swing vote on the bench, the balance of
which may shift against marriage equality if, for example, the
Republicans win the White House in 2016 and a departing Justice
Ginsburg is replaced by a more conservative justice.171 Perhaps the
pressure of being the swing vote is too much, and he is stalling,
waiting to see how the future composition of the Court might change
and determine the future of same-sex marriage adjudication, leaving
169. On the latter point, the Bishop court in the 2014 Oklahoma
constitutional amendment case stated, “There is no precise legal label
for what has occurred in Supreme Court jurisprudence beginning with
Romer in 1996 and culminating in Windsor in 2013, but this Court
knows a rhetorical shift when it sees one.” Bishop v. United States ex
rel. Holder, No. 04-CV-848-TCK-TLW, 2014 WL 116013, at *33 (N.D.
Okla. Jan. 14, 2014).
170. “[T]he appropriate exercise of judicial power requires that important
constitutional issues not be decided unnecessarily where narrower
grounds exist for according relief. This consideration applies even
though such grounds are not raised in the jurisdictional submissions.”
Communist Party of Indiana v. Whitcomb, 414 U.S. 441, 451 n.1 (1974)
(Powell, J., concurring) (citing Boynton v. Virginia, 364 U.S. 454, 457
(1960); Barr v. Matteo, 355 U.S. 171, 172 (1957)). See also Craig Green,
Wiley Rutledge, Executive Detention, and Judicial Conscience at War,
84 WASH. U. L. REV. 99, 114 (2006) (describing “the modern Court’s
preference for narrow reasoning”); Michael F. Perry, Recent
Development, Avoiding Mead: The Problem with Unanimity in Long
Island Care at Home, 31 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 1183, 1183–84
(2008) (describing “Chief Justice Roberts’s announced preference for
narrow and unanimous opinions”).
171. As a matter of politics and procedure, it will now be more difficult for
any party to block judicial nominees, now that the Democrats have
exercised the “nuclear option” of eliminating judicial nomination
filibusters altogether. See David Welna, With Nominees Stalled,
Democrats Reprise Filibuster Threat, NPR: IT’S ALL POLitics (Nov.
20, 2013, 6:06 PM), http://www.npr.org/blogs/itsallpolitics/2013/11/20
/246394094/with-nominees-stalled-democrats-reprise-filibuster-threat.
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the decision, ultimately, up to the voters to decide rather than
bearing the burden himself.
Justice Kennedy’s motivation in throwing both federalism-like
and narrowing language into Windsor, which is otherwise a powerful
opinion affirming broad equal liberty principles, may be related to the
minimalist movement’s lingering, if diminished, impact on the Court.
With several amicus briefs filed on the side of the LGBT litigants in
the Supreme Court marriage cases urging a more narrow or
conservative approach, the pressure was on the Court to refrain from
issuing too broad an opinion. Had Windsor been even more sweeping
and lofty in tone than it already was, perhaps Kennedy felt it would
have risked either causing overt backlash or simply not being taken as
seriously. Instead, by writing an opinion that was more moderate in
tone, honoring both conservative principles of minimalist narrow
adjudication and federalism (at least on the surface) and doctrinally
liberal principles of equal liberty, Kennedy struck a careful but not
overly cautious balance honoring the different voices and concerns
raised in the context of a controversial social issue.
Justice Kennedy may have sent mixed signals in tempering both
Lawrence and Windsor with language affecting a cautious tone
without significantly limiting the precedential force of those cases.
Nonetheless, even if such careful writing is to be described as artifice,
it is acceptable artifice, cautiously building for the greater good,
brick-by-brick and layer-by-layer, the most solid, carefully constructed
doctrinal basis for future marriage equality and other equal liberty
decisions possible, anticipating and answering objections from various
critics even as the architecture for a new era of equality is put
into place.
Just as Windsor is not truly a federalist decision, neither is it
truly a narrow or minimalist decision when viewed in its entirety,
limiting language and federalism lip service aside. Justice Kennedy
went farther than he had to in authoring Windsor’s affirmance of the
Second Circuit’s decision in several respects. Although federalism was
not the approach argued by Edie Windsor, Kennedy did not have to
go beyond the federalism argument offered by amici that marriage is
traditionally an issue left to the States, rendering DOMA an
unconstitutional trouncing of state sovereignty. But he did, forsaking
a narrow federalist approach for a broader individual rights approach.
He did not have to reach the issue of harm to children, which was not
directly at issue in Windsor, but he did, flipping the script on equal
marriage opponents who have historically tried to justify same-sex
marriage bans in the name of protecting children. Anticipatorily
rebutting such arguments that might occur in a future marriage case,
Kennedy poignantly points out in the Windsor majority opinion that
marriage recognition denials result in “humiliat[ing] tens of thousands
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of children now being raised by same-sex couples”172 and that DOMA
“makes it even more difficult for the children to understand the
integrity and closeness of their own family and its concord with other
families in their community and in their daily lives.”173 And in listing
DOMA’s harms, Kennedy included those harms suffered by children
of same-sex couples denied marriage rights, such as the harm resulting
from the statute’s message to “all persons with whom same-sex
couples interact, including their own children, that their marriage is
less worthy than the marriages of others.”174
Finally, while Windsor’s immediate holding was limited to those
same-sex marriages performed in states allowing same-sex marriage,
this does not preclude its later extension to cases involving the right
of same-sex couples in all states to marry. As Justice Scalia
helpfully offers:
In my opinion, however, the view that this Court will take
of state prohibition of same-sex marriage is indicated beyond
mistaking by today’s opinion. As I have said, the real rationale
of today’s opinion, whatever disappearing trail of its legalistic
argle-bargle one chooses to follow, is that DOMA is motivated
by “‘bare . . . desire to harm’” couples in same-sex marriages.
Supra, at 2691. How easy it is, indeed how inevitable, to reach
the same conclusion with regard to state laws denying same-sex
couples marital status. Consider how easy (inevitable) it is to
make the following substitutions in a passage from today’s
opinion ante, at 2694:
“DOMA’s This state law’s principal effect is to identify a subset
of state-sanctioned marriages constitutionally protected sexual
relationships, see Lawrence, and make them unequal. The
principal purpose is to impose inequality, not for other reasons
like governmental efficiency. Responsibilities, as well as rights,
enhance the dignity and integrity of the person. And DOMA
this state law contrives to deprive some couples married under
the laws of their State enjoying constitutionally protected sexual
relationships, but not other couples, of both rights and
responsibilities.”175

As an additional example of things not being quite what they
seem, there is some true irony in Justice Scalia, who appears to be the
172. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2694.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 2696 (emphasis added).
175. Id. at 2709–10 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (alteration in original) (quoting id.
at 2691, 2693 (majority opinion)).
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Justice most vehemently opposed to same-sex marriage, being the one
to spell out most clearly how Windsor provides the clear precedent for
a future decision striking down state laws banning same-sex marriage.
There is also reciprocal irony in Justice Kennedy, the Justice most
likely to author that future opinion recognizing individual rights of
LGBT citizens to marry the person of their choice, having yet to own
that all of the Court’s recent LGBT rights opinions—authored by
him—build the solid, undeniable foundation for that future decision.
Strange ducks though the Justices may at times appear,176 they are
ultimately human, with motivations that can only be surmised by
Court-watchers; we will never know for certain what prompts them to
adjudicate in the sometimes less-than-straightforward way that
they do.
One can only conjecture what Justice Scalia’s motive is in
handing marriage equality proponents the wording of a future
marriage equality decision on a silver platter.177 In the end, he is right
about Windsor: it is not a federalist decision but is, rather, a powerful
individual rights–based precedent for a future marriage equality
affirmation. When Justice Scalia’s illustrative dissents spelling out the
path toward future marriage equality decisions are read in
conjunction with the Court’s previous declaration in Lawrence that
“[e]quality of treatment and the due process right to demand respect
176. Justice Scalia has even, in an admittedly entirely different context,
literally quacked like a duck. In 2004, while defending his decision not to
recuse himself from a case involving former Vice President Dick Cheney,
with whom Scalia is a friend and duck hunting partner, Scalia stated to
a college audience with his trademark defiant wit, “[The case] did not
involve a lawsuit against Dick Cheney as a private individual, . . . This
was a government issue. It’s acceptable practice to socialize with
executive branch officials when there are not personal claims against
them. That’s all I’m going to say for now. Quack, quack.” See Dan
Collins, Justice Scalia Defends Cheney Trip, AP (March 18,
2004, 10:35 AM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/justice-scalia-defendscheney-trip/ (emphasis added).
177. Allow one last cynical conjecture about veiled meanings of judicial
statements: Scalia’s emphasis of “this” in his statement that “the view
that this Court will take of state prohibition of same-sex marriage is
indicated beyond mistaking by today’s opinion” may betray his view of
the Court as little more than a political entity, governed by the political
bent of its majority members. If this is a fair reading, it demonstrates
his intent to use his dissents as lobbying tools, to the extent they signal
to the voters the need to change the Court from “this” Court to a new
Court. With this cynical lens held to Scalia’s dissents in LGBT rights
cases, it may explain his pattern of spelling out how the opinions he is
dissenting from will likely lead to a future same-sex marriage equality
opinion. He does so not to help those Justices accomplish the result he
appears to abhor but to point out to others the danger of such a result
happening. His audience is not the Court, or even lower courts, but,
rather, a certain ilk of American voters.
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for conduct protected by the substantive guarantee of liberty are
linked in important respects,”178 one can easily envision a future
opinion citing Lawrence and Windsor to affirm equal marriage rights.
Such an opinion built on past equal liberty cases might, for example,
conclude that the “right to demand respect” and equal treatment
under law includes a right of all same-sex couples, not just those
already legally married, to demand respect in the form of equal
marriage rights.
Whatever exact form the final swan song for marriage inequality
takes, it will surely be one that rejects any raised federalist claim,
whether minimalist-inspired or otherwise, based on the alleged power
of states to deny same-sex marriage rights. In that inevitable decision
affirming same-sex marriage equality for once and for all, the Court
will rise above the hollow minimalism of the past to offer a new
optimistic model for the critical and necessary role of judicial review
in protecting freedom from governmental discrimination in the equal
protection of our most intimate life partnerships and families.

178. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 575 (2003) (emphasis added).
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